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Article
Compulsory Conjugality
EREZ ALONI
What happens when the state changes the default rules that govern financial
obligations between unmarried partners from opt in to opt out? Most states have an
opt-in rule: unmarried partners do not take on financial obligations of one another
unless they agree to do so with a contract. Nevertheless, advocates argue that an
opt-out system puts the burden in the right place: unmarried couples who want to
avoid default obligations should bear the burden of making contracts. A scholarly
debate over the opt-in/opt-out model has raged for twenty years, but the issue is now
coming to a head. Yet no research, until now, examines the actual impact of opt-out
rules on affected couples.
This Article offers a new analysis based on an original qualitative study with
interviews of thirty unmarried couples in an opt-out jurisdiction. The study reveals
that most cohabiting couples do not know that the law considers them spouses. For
those who know, either they do not realize that they can opt out, or they face
difficulties trying to do so. Moreover, if couples do not opt out, the terms of the
default contract the state imposes are not particularly popular—only about half of
interviewees would have chosen these terms if they had thought to bargain. Further
complicating things, the research shows that sometimes the opt-out law has an
expressive effect: it communicates values of conjugality and commitment. Using this
data, and relying on contractual theories, this Article contends that the opt-out
scheme is choice-decreasing because it makes defaults highly sticky. Yet, contrary
to the traditionalist view, an opt-out approach does not undermine the institution of
marriage. Instead, this approach aligns with the neoliberal ambition to shift
dependency-related responsibilities from the state to the family. Finally, this Article
proposes that for opt-out regimes to avoid mimicking the problems of opt-in
schemes, defaults must be better known to couples, be better tailored to diverse
populations of unmarried couples, and adopt accessible methods of opting out.
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Compulsory Conjugality
EREZ ALONI*
INTRODUCTION
The skyrocketing number of people who live in nonmarital relationships
in the United States presents daunting, yet vital, regulatory challenges.
Noting “the record number of unmarried cohabitants in the United States . . .
and the need for greater clarity and predictability in the law governing
cohabitants’ economic rights,” the Uniform Law Commission recently
appointed a Drafting Committee on Economic Rights of Unmarried Couples
to create a model law.1 Scholarship on the topic, which has grown in recent
years, is greatly divided about what legal resolution is optimal but in
agreement it poses one of the most challenging contemporary regulatory
questions.2
*

Associate Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. I am grateful
to Adam Vanzella Yang, a PhD student in UBC’s Department of Sociology, for his enormous
contribution to multiple aspects of this project. Thanks also to Albertina Antognini, Susan Frelich
Appleton, Khiara M. Bridges, Mary Anne Case, Melissa J. Durkee, Janet Halley, Hoi Kong, Courtney
Joslin, Robin A. Lenhardt, Kaiponanea Matsumura, Melissa Murray, Rachel Rebouché, James Stewart,
Edward Stein, Sarah L. Swan, Allison Anna Tait, and Régine Tremblay for immensely helpful feedback
on the project at different stages. I would also like to thank participants at the 16th World Conference of
the International Society of Family Law in Amsterdam; Annual Family Law and Scholars Conference at
Cardozo Law School; Peter A. Allard School of Law Faculty Colloquium; UBC Green College Leading
Scholars’ Series; University of Haifa, Faculty of Law Seminar; 22nd Annual Meeting of the Association
for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities; Law and Society Association Annual Meeting in
Washington, D.C.; the Roundtable on Nonmarriage and the Law at Sandra Day O’Connor College of
Law; Faculty Seminar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s Faculty of Law; and the University of
Chicago Law School Workshop on Regulating Family, Sex, and Gender, where I presented earlier
versions of this Article. I am also indebted to Joan Braun, Carly Stanhope, Lauren Morris, Sophia M.
Matthew and Ryan Brown for their excellent research assistance. I am thankful to the BC Law Foundation
for its generous financial support for this project.
1
Submission to Committee on Scope and Program: Proposal for Study Committee to Explore
Feasibility of Uniform Law Governing Economic Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants, UNIF. L. COMM’N
(2016), https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/joint-jeb-proposal-for-studycommit?CommunityKey=\1e989ea5-ad22-4777-9805-cb5f14cae658&tab=librarydocuments (last visited
Feb. 8, 2020). In December 2016, the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Family Law and the Joint
Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts submitted a proposal to the Uniform Law Commission
to form a committee to study the “feasibility of a uniform act governing the economic rights of unmarried
cohabitants.” Id. The proposal was accepted, and a drafting committee was formed in 2018. Economic
Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants Committee, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committ
ees/community-home?CommunityKey=5f044999-b4b3-458a-b6d4-d984885d913b (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
2
See, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis, The Flexible Family in Three Dimensions, 28 L. & INEQ. 291, 291
(2010) (“One of the central questions facing American family law throughout the last quarter century,
and continuing today, is how to respond to the ‘extraordinary growth in the rate of nonmarital
cohabitation.’”) (internal citation omitted); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal
Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 174 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he shift toward
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One approach that looms large in discussions as a potential reform is
adopting an “opt-out” scheme.3 Under such a regime, the state treats
unmarried couples that meet certain criteria, upon breakup, as owing the
same obligations to one another as married couples unless they deliberately
contract out of those obligations. A version of an opt-out scheme already
operates in Washington and Nevada, and the American Law Institute (ALI)
endorsed it in 2002.4 If adopted in more jurisdictions, an opt-out scheme
could affect millions of unmarried couples who will face the burden of
opting out if they do not want to assume marital obligations (if they even
know about the law and understand it is possible to opt out).
Notwithstanding the consequences of such a regime, scholarship examining
the real-life operation of an opt-out scheme and its effects is barely existent.
This Article presents the first research that uses an empirical qualitative
method—specifically, interviews with unmarried couples who live in an optout jurisdiction—combined with theoretical analysis to inquire into how an
opt-out regime affects cohabiting couples’ lives.5
The stakes are high, and the regulatory terrain is complex. Without
appropriate legal recognition, partners at the end of non-formalized
relationships have found themselves without rights against the other
regarding property or spousal support, even when they are functionally
similar to couples protected by matrimonial property legislation.6
Conversely, when recognition is overinclusive—that is, when the state casts

the nonmarital family is the most important challenge facing family law today, . . . . Yet existing literature
does not adequately address this phenomenon.”).
3
An opt-out approach, sometimes referred to as a “de-facto marriage” or “status-based” approach,
is specifically mentioned in the foundational documents of the Drafting Committee on Economic Rights
of Unmarried Couples as one of the primary existing approaches that the Committee will consider. See
UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 1, at 4. See infra Section I.A for arguments in favor of and against an optout approach; see also Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Consent to Intimate Regulation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1013,
1042 (2018) (“[T]he status approach has found favor with influential legal scholars.”).
4
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 4.09–
4.10, 5.04, 6.04–6.06 (AM. L. INST. 2002) [hereafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. For discussion about the states
that have adopted a version of an opt-out regime, see Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58
B.C. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2017) (“A limited number of states—two—apply the rules regulating property
distribution at divorce to the end of a nonmarital relationship. They are Nevada and Washington, and
both apply the rules ‘by analogy’ only.”) (internal citation omitted).
5
William Eskridge noted the need to produce empirical data before an evaluation of the desirability
of an opt-out approach. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime
of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1985 (2012) (“In my view,
cohabitation regimes ought not mimic marriage, contrary to the ALI’s Principles and the views of many
scholars. . . . Because these ideas have not been subject to empirical testing, they ought to remain
preliminary . . . .”).
6
See, e.g., Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1999, 2038–39
(2017) (“[D]efining choice narrowly poses the risk that partners will be able to avoid obligations to each
other or improperly enrich themselves at the state’s expense.”). Albertina Antognini, Against Nonmarital
Exceptionalism, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1891, 1894 n.7 (2018). See also infra Section I.A (discussing the
multiple interests in regulation of informal relationships).
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its net too widely—it can frustrate couples’ expectations and preferences.7
Further, crafting a customized regulation is a challenging task because
informal cohabitation is a heterogeneous practice—meaning that couples
refrain from marrying for different reasons and adopt various commitment
levels—thus, a one-size-fits-all strategy is likely to fit some while being
detrimental to others.8
Due to these complications, and despite an urgent need to adjust
legislation, most jurisdictions in the United States have declined to adopt
reforms and still rely on a contractual opt-in approach that has proven itself
inadequate in protecting unmarried partners.9 Conversely, in recent years,
some jurisdictions worldwide (notably Australia and some Canadian
provinces) have moved from the traditional opt-in approach to an opt-out
regime.10 In an opt-out system, couples are married by default. This
approach’s presumed advantages are that it promotes certainty about what
the law is, minimizes litigation, and values functions over formalities.
Further, this scheme supposedly protects the economically vulnerable
party—typically the partner who performs a large share of unpaid
carework.11 Scholarship in the United States and elsewhere has long debated
the wisdom of an opt-out approach.12 In a nutshell, the traditionalist response
contends that equating unmarried relationships to marriage would lead to a
decline in marriages and confusion about what each legal institution
entails.13 Conversely, the functional approach supports an opt-out scheme,
deeming it consistent with the law’s objectives of protecting couples’
7
See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1305 (2014) (noting the
critique against an opt-out regime “for being too inclusive because it may impose marital obligations on
people who may be uninterested in taking on such obligations.”).
8
See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 58–59 (2016)
(concluding that decisions about how to structure the law governing nonmarital relationships should be
taken seriously and should consider the “full continuum of nonmarital relationships”); Wendy D.
Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Measuring and Modeling Cohabitation: New Perspectives from
Qualitative Data, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 989, 995 (2005) (finding that 53% of survey “respondents
did not describe the process of cohabitation as a deliberate decision.”).
9
See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Autonomy in the Family, 66 UCLA L. REV. 912, 926 (2019)
(“Marvin removed the barrier that prevented nonmarital cohabitants from asserting claims that other
nonspouses could assert. But . . . the default rule that applies to nonmarital partners is one of no sharing.”);
infra Section I.B (discussing the drawbacks of an opt-in approach).
10
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, With Marriage on the Decline and Cohabitation on the Rise, What
About Marital Rights for Unmarried Partners?, 41 ACTEC L.J. 49, 82 nn.155–56 (2015) (citing
legislation recognizing marital rights in Australia and Canada, respectively).
11
See generally id. at 50–56 (discussing the shifting marital trends in the United States and the need
for reform should those trends persist); infra Section I.A.
12
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the
Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 295 (2015) (“Many contemporary
scholars and policy advocates challenge the privileged status of marriage, arguing that the state should
recognize and support other family relationships.”).
13
See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 857 (2005) (arguing that an opt-out regime “discourages
marital commitment and investment” and “devalues marriage”).
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dependency and contribution to the relationship. Further, it recognizes
relationships based on family members’ roles, rather than on formalities like
marriage or contract.14
This Article intervenes in this debate by providing the first empirical
findings on the effects that an opt-out regime has on informal relationships.
In 2013, following the promulgation of the Family Law Act (“FLA”), the
province of British Columbia (“BC”) in Canada became one of the only
jurisdictions globally to adopt an opt-out approach.15 Five years after the
FLA’s enactment, I used couples’ experience in BC as a real-world
laboratory to evaluate the effectiveness, shortcomings, and strengths of an
opt-out approach, as well as the ways unmarried couples navigate this
regime. To this end, I interviewed thirty couples (urban, middle-class
individuals aged 21–48) who moved in together after the law was already in
effect. I examined couples’ knowledge and understanding of laws
concerning their mutual obligations and how such laws influenced their
decisions about moving in together and negotiating mutual obligations. I
also asked about the kinds of obstacles couples face when they wish to opt
out, why they remain unmarried, how they divide housework labor, how
they construe their household finances, their plans for the future, and more.16
I used their responses to analyze whether the law fulfills its objectives and
whether it is a majoritarian default, as well as to assess the expressive
function of the law—meaning, the law’s interplay between reflecting
couples’ norms of commitment and mutual support and sending a statement
about the importance of such norms.
Overall, the research raises significant doubt about whether an opt-out
approach—as construed in BC and by analogy elsewhere—is the panacea
for the regulatory conundrum of nonmarriage.17 The interviews revealed that
couples barely know or understand the law, experience difficulties in opting
out, and exhibit cognitive biases and overoptimism in discussing financial
obligations.18 These barriers to opting out suggest an opt-out approach, in
effect, creates mandatory-like rules. In contractual terminology, the defaults
are “super-sticky.”19 The upshot is that the “choice” to opt out from the
14
See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 5 (2008) (Proposing a functional approach, according to which there would
be no bright-line rule for the division of benefits and protections by the state. Instead, the law’s protection
of the familial unit would be distributed by the purpose of the law at stake and the function the family
members fulfill).
15
Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25 (Can.).
16
See infra Part II for discussion of methodology.
17
My conclusion is not exclusive to BC’s scheme, as the barriers I found are ubiquitous in all
common-law systems that rely on contractual principles to establish and ascertain legal obligations
among unmarried partners. See infra Section III.B.
18
See infra Section III.A (describing and analyzing the responses of participants in the study).
19
See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 651, 651 (2006) (explaining that “[i]n settings where these [transaction] costs are high, parties
might find themselves ‘stuck’ in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer.”); see also infra
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default becomes all but illusory. The system’s reliance on contractual
instruments means that most couples subscribe to (or find themselves
abiding by) the default rules in lieu of an affirmative undertaking or, in some
cases, even without tacit consent.
Despite this, an argument can be made that the default rules are still
justified if they are majoritarian (representing what the majority of couples
would have bargained for had they foreseen the need).20 Surprisingly, for
this research sample, the defaults of equal division of property and
obligations for spousal support mimic the expectations and practices of
approximately half of the interviewees.21 In particular, the defaults do not
reflect the lives of interviewees not yet ready to commit to the relationship
or those with lower incomes than most others in the sample.
Making things more complicated is the observation that the law, when
it is known to the couples, also promotes conjugality (marriage-like
behavior) by communicating a norm of commitment and mutual
responsibility between the partners.22 It is thus difficult to distinguish
couples’ attitudes toward the default rules and the way they structure the
economics of their household from the way the law shapes their expectations
in the first place. The interviews reveal how the law’s expressive aspect
helps some partners to justify and, sometimes, defend their legal entitlement
to the same protections that spouses receive.
Taken all together—barriers to opting out, non-majoritarian, and the
law’s effect on the couples’ expectations—an opt-out approach has the
potential to make conjugality virtually compulsory. In operation, it does not
advance the functional recognition of interdependency. Rather, it makes
most couples de facto married, creating a status that risks dishonoring their
preferences or actual behaviors. Furthermore, while an opt-out regime might
help the partner with the primary caregiving responsibilities(most often,
women), it can be detrimental to women with low income and wealth who
might abstain from marriage purposely to avoid a partner’s debt.23
The interviews also alleviate traditionalism’s concern that an opt-out
regime will undermine marriage.24 Approximately half of the participants
Section III.B (analyzing the ascriptive features of default rules).
20
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1591, 1592–93 (1999) (positing that majoritarian default rules are designed to reflect the presumed choice
of the majority of relevant bargainers).
21
This is a smaller majoritarian default than I expected, especially considering that couples in early
adulthood are in the prime period for accumulating assets and creating strong emotional ties with their
partners; further, sociological studies contend that cohabitants and married couples often share similar
characteristics in terms of their financial behavior and expectations. See infra Section III.C.1 (discussing
sociological data about cohabiting couples’ attitudes toward the law and their patterns of economic
interdependency).
22
See infra Section III.D.
23
See infra Section IV.A, pp. 47–49 (analyzing how an opt-out approach has the potential to support
and to harm the primary caregiver in the household).
24
See infra Section IV.B.
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still wanted to get married at a later point, although the law already
recognizes them as spouses. Others, who do not want to get married,
expressed reasons that are external to the law.25 Hence, an opt-out regime
does not undermine marriage. Moreover, an opt-out approach actually
advances neoliberal values that some conservatives emphasize. The scheme
significantly increases the number of couples subject to the same obligations
as married couples and, hence, intensifies the private support obligations.
Doing so further privatizes dependency and support, thus obviating the
state’s collective responsibility regarding such vulnerability and shifting
responsibility onto private individuals.26
This research should be of interest to scholars and lawmakers in the
United States and globally. The Hague Conference on Private International
Law has recently placed “cohabitation outside marriage” as one of its
primary current legislative topics.27 BC is an excellent terrain to examine the
operation of an opt-out approach. Indeed, the Canadian model served as a
primary inspiration to the ALI Principles and the scholarship supporting it.28
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the demographic
changes in relationship patterns in the United States and across various
nations and the challenges they pose for regulation. It describes the major
debates concerning opt-in and opt-out mechanisms. Part II details the study’s
objectives and the methodology used, and it canvasses some of the study’s
limitations. Part III analyzes the responses of interviewees. It uses
contractual, economic, and sociological theories to understand how couples
operate in this system. Part IV then develops a critique of both functional
and traditionalist approaches to the opt-out regime. The Conclusion offers
some initial proposals about a system that might overcome the problems in
an opt-out regime or make opt-out regimes less ascriptive.
I. THE CHALLENGES AND THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES
Before explaining the methods and analyzing the results, it is imperative
to understand the regulatory regime governing the obligations of unmarried
couples and the dilemmas it poses. Section A provides data about the
25

See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
See infra Section IV.C (describing the ways in which an opt-out regime promotes privatization
of dependency).
27
Responses to the 2016 Questionnaire on Private International Law Issues Relating to
Cohabitation Outside Marriage (Including Registered Partnerships), HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L.,
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/cohabitation/responses (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
28
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 34 (“In its operative provisions, Chapter 6 draws inspiration
from Canada . . . .”). See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic
Partner Principles are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 354 (2004)
(comparing “American developments . . . with those in Canada, where little difference exists in the legal
treatment of spouses and cohabiting same-sex and opposite-sex couples.”); CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN,
UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 186–93 (2010) (relying on the Canadian model as
inspiration for an opt-out proposal).
26
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demographic changes in family structure that make the legal regulation of
partners in informal relationships a pressing matter. It also analyzes the
challenges to regulation. Section B discusses the strengths and shortcomings
of the opt-in and opt-out approaches. It further elucidates what is unknown
about an opt-out model’s operation and the importance of continued study.
A. Regulating is Hard to Do
Addressing unmarried couples’ legal needs has been a critical and
charged issue in family law over the past forty years.29 Since the 1980s, in
many industrial nations, the number of people living in nonmarital unions
has grown steeply and consistently.30 In the United States, approximately
nine million couples live in informal conjugal relationships, almost a 30%
increase from 2007.31 In Canada, over 3.7 million individuals live in
nonmarital relationships.32 In 2016, over 20% of all couples lived in
informal cohabitation—more than three times the proportion in 1981.33 In
the United Kingdom, 3.2 million couples live in nonmarital unions, making
cohabitation the country’s fastest-growing family type.34 The decline of
marriage rates also translates into a reduction in the number of married
parents. In the United States, 25% of parents who reside with children are
unmarried.35 In 2011, in Canada, 45% of women in unmarried relationships
had at least one child at home.36
This demographic change in the number of unmarried couples who
cohabit raises formidable regulatory dilemmas. In many countries—
although to differing degrees—the legal recognition of marriage and of
29
Anne Sanders, Cohabitants in Private Law: Trust, Frustration and Unjust Enrichment in
England, Germany and Canada, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 629, 630–31 (2013).
30
See BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 97–99 (reporting the increase of cohabitants from the 1960s to
2000s in the United States); Waggoner, supra note 10, at 51–55 (noting the decline in marriage rates and
increase in cohabitations in the United States).
31
See, e.g., Matsumura, supra note 3, at 1016 (“Unmarried cohabitants—over 18 million of them—
now make up 7.1% of the adult population.”); Renee Stepler, Number of U.S. Adults Cohabiting with a
Partner Continues to Rise, Especially Among Those 50 and Older, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 6, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/06/number-of-u-s-adults-cohabiting-with-a-partnercontinues-to-rise-especially-among-those-50-and-older/ (“Since 2007, the number of cohabiting adults
ages 50 and older grew by 75%.”).
32
Estimates of Population as of July 1st, By Marital Status or Legal Marital Status, Age and Sex,
STAT. CAN., https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710006001 (last modified July 29,
2020).
33
Families, Households and Marital Status: Key Results from the 2016 Census, STAT. CAN. (Aug.
2, 2017), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/170802/dq170802a-eng.htm.
34
Families and Households in the UK: 2015, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT. (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/bulletins/f
amiliesandhouseholds/2015-11-05.
35
Gretchen Livingston, The Changing Profile of Unmarried Parents, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 25,
2018), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/04/25/the-changing-profile-of-unmarried-parents/.
36
Anne Milan, Families and Living Arrangements, in WOMEN IN CANADA: A GENDER-BASED
STATISTICAL REPORT 11 (2015), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-503-x/2015001/article/14235-eng.htm.
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marriage-like relationships has profound legal effects.37 In the United States,
more than in other countries, the federal and state governments distribute
numerous benefits via marriage.38 Marital status establishes default and
mandatory obligations between the partners themselves and sets of
entitlements and rights between the spouses and third parties, particularly
the state.39 Though few default rules are mandatory, states establish default
obligations on the partners vis-à-vis one another, both during and, primarily,
at the end of relationships (e.g., financial support during relationships, equal
division of property upon breakup, elective share in inheritance).40
Similarly, legal recognition is relevant for various state-sanctioned
purposes such as tax benefits and penalties, health benefits, immigration
privileges, preferential treatment of pension plans, and the power to make
healthcare decisions when the partner is incapacitated.41 The large number
of legal effects attendant to marriage (or marriage-like relationships) is not
entirely surprising. A primary purpose of state recognition of intimate
partnerships is the ability to rely on “an off-the-rack rule to structure certain
relations between members of the couple and third parties.”42 Put differently,
one of the main modern functions of the legal recognition of relationships is
to provide a simple way to designate an intimate partner for various legal
purposes that arise as a result of mutual commitment and interdependence,
without the need to execute contracts, wills, powers of attorney, or other
forms of affirmative selection.43
37
I use “legal effects” as acknowledgment that recognized relationships have different legal
consequences across various legal contexts, forms, and fora. See Janet Halley, Behind the Law of
Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage System, 6 UNBOUND 1, 44–49, 53 (2010) (proposing
“[s]eeing marriage as its effects” instead of a status or contract).
38
See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Black Marriage, White People, Red Herrings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 977,
996–97 (2013) (“In the United States, less marriage equals greater familial instability because marriage
is the social safety net—or at the very least, the means by which we patch what is left of the disintegrating
social safety net.”).
39
See Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 235, 258 (2011) (“The ‘privileges or obligations of marriage’ are vast.”); Halley, supra note 37, at
49–50 (listing the legal attributes of marriage); see also L. COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY:
RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 115–17 (2001),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1720747 (describing the legal organization of
personal relationships in Canada).
40
See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c I-160 (Can.) (holding a person liable for the debt of their
spouse, in the case of a property transfer between them); Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”:
Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 12–16 (2003) (discussing
the duty of support and services within marriage).
41
See, e.g., Emens, supra note 39, at 258 (listing the “benefits and burdens” that state and federal
laws bestow upon married couples); Halley, supra note 39, at 49–50 (listing the legal attributes of
marriage); Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c 12 (Can.) (extending benefits
and obligations of spouses to all couples who cohabitate for at least one year).
42
Mary Anne Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1783 (2005).
43
See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 618 (2013) (“Thus, when the
state does not rely solely on contracts but offers an opt-in scheme as well, the government is not intruding
into people’s lives but, instead, giving people a better means of regulating the legal implications of their
relationships.”).
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Because of the many attributes connected to marriage, when informal
relationships are unrecognized, some couples are likely to suffer harms, both
financial and dignitary.44 Without legal recognition, nonmarried partners at
the end of their relationships have found themselves deprived of property
rights (even when the parties’ joint effort helped accumulate wealth),
without spousal support, or both.45 As Clare Huntington explains, “courts
treat unmarried cohabitants as separate economic units, with claims for
spousal support possible but rarely granted and property typically retained
by whoever paid for it.”46 Lack of legal recognition also means denying a
host of benefits and rights the state and other third parties distribute through
marriage or other recognized relationships (such as civil unions, where they
exist).47 The harm is also dignitary, as nonrecognition may stigmatize
unmarried couples—casting their relationships as “inferior” to formally
recognized ones.48 Although it is clear that some relationships flourish
outside the auspices of the law, the mere denial of legal recognition might
send a message that unmarried partnerships are “lesser” than other types of
relationships.49

44
When looking at the economic and cultural harms of nonrecognition, I build on Nancy Fraser’s
well-known work that conceptualizes both elements as “folk paradigms of justice.” NANCY FRASER &
AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 11 (Joel
Golb, James Ingram, & Christiane Wilke trans., 2003) (emphasis omitted); see also Aloni, supra note 7,
at 1300–02 (describing the harm of nonrecognition as “economic injustice and dignitary-cultural harm”).
45
See Aloni, supra note 43, at 589–90 (noting instances when nonmarried partners purchase
property together, but upon death or separation, only one of them retains property rights); Winifred
Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation of Marriage and
Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114, 127–28 (2000) (observing that historically, cohabitants in Canada
were “excluded from the rights and obligations which attached automatically to marriage”); BOWMAN,
supra note 28, at 38–52 (explaining the inadequacy of equitable and contractual remedies).
46
Huntington, supra note 2 at 178.
47
See L. COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 39, at 120–21 (noting legal consequences stemming from
the lack of legal recognition); POLIKOFF, supra note 14, at 123–35 (observing that same-sex couples that
are not recognized as married are excluded from legal benefits).
48
The stigma of being unmarried has declined significantly over the years. In 2012, a national
survey in the United States found that 55% of participants stated that getting married is not an important
experience to become an adult, while only 12% stated that getting married is “extremely important.”
JONATHAN VESPA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE CHANGING ECONOMICS AND DEMOGRAPHICS OF YOUNG
ADULTHOOD:
1975–2016
4
(Apr.
2017),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/p20-579.pdf.
49
For discussions of the complexities of legally recognizing friendships, see Katherine M.
Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2703 (2008) (“[T]he rules, the norms, and the
social field of friendship are developed beyond the scope and even interest of law.”); ETHAN J. LEIB,
FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT
2 (2011) (suggesting some regulation of friendships would be beneficial but acknowledging that most
people think “that friendship is a special part of our private spheres that the public sphere of the law can’t
touch”). Laura Rosenbury argues that nonrecognition of nonconjugal relationships—in particular,
friendships—adversely affects women by preserving the traditional division of carework. Laura A.
Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (2007).
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At the same time, in a world in which informal relationships are facilely
recognized as legally equivalent to marriage, individuals are likely, as well,
to suffer injuries regarding their finances and their dignity and autonomy.50
A partner who might want to protect herself from an untrusted companion
or the responsibility for her partner’s debt, or a couple who departs from
conventional marital sharing norms, might find themselves married against
their will.51 Legal recognition can also be financially detrimental: when the
state ascribes marital status to unmarried couples to calculate eligibility for
state-sponsored financial support, this might result in disqualification for
welfare benefits, loans, subsidized housing, Medicaid, etc.52 Further,
prescribing marital obligations between couples serves as a mechanism to
shift the responsibility of supporting individuals in times of economic
hardship from the state onto needy couples.53 Overinclusiveness in
recognition, then, raises a set of challenges too.
Legal nonrecognition versus broad ascribed recognition—the two
binaries of the regulatory conundrum— exemplifies a tension between overand under-inclusive policies.54 A policy that triggers state recognition too
effortlessly risks misclassification and thus being over-inclusive. Such
policy is likely to assign marital status arbitrarily and imprecisely, casting a
wide net that captures individuals who purposely aimed to avoid recognition
and relationships that do not fit the economic and emotional interdependence
patterns that the state aims to capture in matrimonial legislation. Conversely,
an underinclusive approach—one that rules out too many relationships as
undeserving of state recognition—is likely to exclude relationships that
merit the state’s protection.
Making the regulatory terrain even more challenging is the lack of
50
Cf. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 8, at 108–09 (“Today, however, nonmarriage has emerged as a
choice; one that exists for couples who want to create their own relationships on their own terms.”).
51
See Robert Leckey, Strange Bedfellows, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 641, 652–53 (2014) (asking whether
a Canadian case that “distinguish[ed] between de facto and de jure spouses embod[ied] prejudice or
stereotype”); Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1569 (2009) (arguing for “a liberal-pluralist case against
equalizing the mutual obligations of cohabitants and married partners”).
52
See Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, supra note 7, at 1320–22 (“[L]iving with an unrelated adult
may change eligibility for welfare because in-kind assistance is calculated in determining eligibility.”);
Lois Harder, The State and the Friendships of the Nation: The Case of Nonconjugal Relationships in the
United States and Canada, 34 SIGNS 633, 649 (2009) (noting that the “Canadian welfare state”
recognizes common-law relationships as marriage); Robert Leckey & Yann Favier, Cohabitation’s
Boundaries and the Confines of Tradition, 25 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 525, 533 (2016) (observing the
relationship between welfare benefits and the private law of family).
53
See Courtney G. Joslin, Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
153, 168–69 (2015) (analyzing the “family-based obligations from the distribution of family-based
subsidies”); Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919,
966–69 (2016) (asserting that privatization of supports is “the essence of family law—a goal that
animates the field and runs through its different elements”).
54
See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1689–90 (1976) (“[A] general rule will be more over- and underinclusive than a
particular rule.”).
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formalities, which renders the task of determining couples’ intentions
“unpredictable and haphazard.”55 For one, most unmarried couples do not
follow formalities, such as executing contracts.56 Although married couples
comply with legal formalities in the solemnization process, when it comes
to other formalities, such as contracts, married couples are also notoriously
bad in entering into ante- or postnuptial contracts.57 In the absence of
formalities, discerning the couples’ intentions becomes a daunting challenge
to administrators and courts.58 Further, even relying on formalities alone
cannot serve as a satisfying mechanism, for the presence of formalities might
indicate the couple’s intention at one point in time—and such intention could
later change.59 Formalities might also indicate an intention that is different
from what couples actually performed or wished.60 Finally, in some
circumstances, overriding the couples’ undertaking (even if expressed in
formal documents) is justified either because of the process by which the
parties executed their instruments (e.g., duress or nondisclosure) or because
the undertaking will lead, or has led, to unconscionable results.61 Hence,
even in the presence of formalities, there is no guarantee that authorized
institutions will enforce the couple’s private agreement.
B. Two Imperfect Approaches
In some countries (the United States and England are the paradigm
cases), laws pertaining to unmarried cohabiting couples have frozen; these
laws struggle to keep pace with the countries’ demographic changes and
regulatory predicaments.62 In other places, primarily through legislative
55

Robert Leckey, Judging in Marriage’s Shadow, 26 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 25, 30 (2018).
See Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1365, 1367–70 (2001) (“[D]ecades of urging by contract enthusiasts have led few couples (married or
unmarried) to make express contracts at all, much less comprehensive contracts intended to capture what
their relationship is all about.”); Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 317, 355 (2016) (“[U]nmarried partners often do not think in contractual terms and do not have
sufficient understanding of the rules surrounding legal obligations between unmarried partners.”).
57
In any event, as Matsumura explains, even a marriage license does not end the recognition
problem, in terms of ascertaining partners’ intentions and interdependency, because getting married
might be too easy and does not reflect deeper obligations that some states require vis-à-vis public benefits
and privileges. Matsumura, supra note 6, at 2013–15.
58
See id. at 2012–13 (discussing the benefits of relying on formalities and the difficulties associated
with ascertaining intentions in informal relationships).
59
See id. at 2045 (discussing the possible changing views of spouses on their relationships).
60
See id. at 2048–50 (discussing cases in which formalities do not reflect a partner’s subjective
intentions to accept financial obligations toward the other).
61
See Aloni, supra note 56, at 348 (discussing procedural and substantive doctrines that enable
courts to set aside familial contracts).
62
See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 2, at 239 (“By continuing to apply a system of law that is
designed for marital families, the state is undermining the shaky bonds in nonmarital families . . . .”).
In 2007, the Law Commission for England and Wales issued a report about cohabitation, stating
that current law “ignores cohabitants altogether” and “is complex, uncertain, expensive to rely on and,
as it was not designed for family circumstances, often gives rise to outcomes that are unjust.” L. COMM’N
56
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reform processes, related laws have been amended to respond to societies’
changing demographics and the inequities that needed addressing. However,
common law jurisdictions have adopted regulatory regimes that have raised
scholarly, policy, and political debates concerning their effectiveness and
fairness.63 In what follows, I categorize various regulatory schemes from
various nations into two general approaches: the traditional opt-in approach
and the opt-out approach.
The opt-in approach is based on contract principles or related equitable
remedies such as unjust enrichment and constructive trust.64 In the United
States, most states use contractual principles in adjudicating claims between
unmarried couples, although they have some material differences in
application.65 In 1976, the Supreme Court of California decided in Marvin
v. Marvin, which at the time was revolutionary, that contracts touching on
financial obligations between unmarried intimate partners do not
categorically violate public policy and are therefore potentially
enforceable.66 Following Marvin, all states but four have permitted couples
to enter into cohabitation contracts that entail agreement about financial
obligations upon future breakup, and some states have used principles of
equitable doctrines to compensate couples for their contribution to the
partnership, at the end of their relationships.67 The variations between the
states’ rules of enforcement are material. For instance, some states, either by
legislation or court decisions, require that cohabitation contracts be subject

ENG. & WALES, NO. 307, COHABITATION: THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF RELATIONSHIP
BREAKDOWN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ¶ 1.4 (2007). Their recommendations for legal change, however,
have not been followed. Simone Wong, Cohabitation Reform in England and Wales: Equality or Equity,
27 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 112, 128 (2015).
63
See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 173–220 (discussing and analyzing the regulatory models
in England, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, France, and Sweden).
64
See id. at 47–52 (discussing rights of unmarried partners based on contract principles); Aloni,
supra note 43, at 587–89 (discussing the same); Robert Leckey, Cohabitants, Choice, and the Public
Interest, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHILDREN’S AND FAMILY LAW 115, 116–17 (Elizabeth
Brake & Lucinda Ferguson eds., 2018) (discussing how common law doctrines in England and Canada
are used to protect unmarried couples); Antognini supra note 6, at 1921–24 (discussing contractual and
equitable approaches in the United States).
65
Antognini, supra note 6, at 1912 (“Jurisdictions address the end of a nonmarital relationship
through one of three general doctrinal approaches.”).
66
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
67
Antognini, supra note 4, at 52 (reporting that the “states that do not recognize rights between
unmarried couples are Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, and Illinois”).
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to the terms of the statute of frauds.68 Still others—for example, New York—
enforce only express agreements.69
In Canada, the provinces of Ontario, New Brunswick, and
Newfoundland and Labrador follow opt-in contractual principles (including
quasi-contracts) when it comes to the property rights of partners vis-à-vis
each other.70 In the jurisdictions that have adopted an opt-in contractual
approach for rights between couples, living together does not raise a
presumption of equal distribution of properties upon breakup. Unless the
couple has executed a contract or can show that a single partner contributed
to the property’s appreciation or purchase, making it unfair for the other
partner to retain the gain, the couple is not entitled to an equal division of
property upon breakdown of the relationship.71 However, in various
contexts, the Canadian federal government defines unmarried couples as
“common law partner[s]” after one year of living in “conjugal
relationships”.72 Thus, some federal rights and obligations (tax, etc.) are
ascriptive. They require partners to opt-in, such as by checking the “married”
or “living common law” boxes on tax returns. Here, the filer does not
choose; if their relationships fall under the definition of “common law,” they
must indicate it. In this sense, the designation is ascriptive and not based on
partners’ choice.73
The shortcomings of an opt-in approach are well documented and I will
not repeat them here in detail.74 One of the major weaknesses of such a
system, as Albertina Antognini recently concluded in an analysis of U.S.
cases, is that it favors partners who contribute financially to the purchase of
property over “a relationship where the individuals follow a breadwinner-

68
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075–.076 (1980) (explaining that a cohabitation agreement is
enforceable only if “the contract is written and signed by the parties”); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759,
762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that cohabitation contracts in Florida must be in writing); Kohler
v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (explaining that“[i]f live-in companions intend to share
property, they should express that intention in writing.”). In 2015, New Jersey passed an amendment to
its statute of frauds requiring that cohabitation contracts be in writing and that both parties have
independent legal advice prior to execution. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c. 60).
69
See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that cohabitation
agreements are enforceable only with an “explicit and structured understanding of an express contract”).
70
JULIEN D. PAYNE & MARILYN A. PAYNE, CANADIAN FAMILY LAW 50 (7th ed. 2017); Sanders,
supra note 29, at 632.
71
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation, and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 248–49 (2004) (“[E]x post determinations of the nature of the
parties’ expectations about financial sharing and support are difficult.”).
72
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (Can.); Income Tax Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c 1 (Can.).
73
Update your CRA Information: Change Your Marital Status, GOV’T OF CAN.,
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/child-family-benefits/update-your-marital-statuscanada-revenue-agency.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) (“You must tell the Canada Revenue Agency
(CRA) about your new marital status . . . .”).
74
See, e.g., id. (discussing the difficulties in enforcing legal obligations in informal relationships).
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homemaker model.”75 The opt-in approach also increases uncertainty
because the law is so unsettled and, for that reason, is likely to result in the
economically weaker partner’s not pursuing claims. For good reasons (not
seeking legal recourse) because in most states, claims based on implied
contacts in this arena are rarely successful. As Cynthia Bowman points out,
it is probable that “cohabitants are only slightly more likely to obtain
‘palimony’ in California than in New York if the claim rests upon an implied
contract, and at least the courts in New York are more candid about
disallowing such claims.”76 Describing the Canadian context in Ontario, one
author notes that unjust enrichment claims are unpredictable and create a
sense of uncertainty in the law.77 In such a legal regime, lawyers are likely
to disfavor representation based on a contingency fee since chances of
success are difficult to assess or are generally slim. Responding to the
limitation of relying on couples to execute contracts, the Law Commission
of Canada stated that a contract “is a tool beyond the reach of many people.
Leaving the parties to design their own contractual or private law
arrangements imposes too high a burden on people who do not have time,
energy or the requisite knowledge to do so.”78 Finally, courts are notorious
for their limited ability to discern partners’ intentions regarding property
division—a process that involves invasion into partners’ intimate life and
risks invoking the judge’s bias.79
In opt-out regimes, the state applies the same financial obligations that
married couples owe to unmarried couples, upon the request of at least one
of the partners, if the nature of the couple’s relationship mimics, to some
degree, that of married couples, regardless of the missing formalities. The
system aims to increase certainty and predictability about unmarried
couples’ legal situation while embracing a functional approach. Australia’s
doctrine of “de facto relationship” and Israel’s doctrine of “reputed spouse”
are examples of such an approach.80 Canadian provinces with this system
are British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan.81
For instance, according to Section 3(1)(b) of BC’s FLA, a person is a
“spouse”—for purposes of the division of property and spousal support—if
they have “lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship” and
“ha[ve] done so for a continuous period of at least 2 years” or “ha[ve] a child
75

Antognini, supra note 4, at 31.
BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 51.
77
L. COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 39, at 115.
78
Id.
79
BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 57; Scott, supra note 72, at 256–57.
80
BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 186–200 (discussing Canada and Australia); Talia Einhorn, SameSex Family Unions in Israeli Law, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 222, 225 (2008).
81
Robert Leckey, Cohabitation, Law Reform, and the Litigants, 31 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 131,
134 (2017) (discussing reforms in Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Manitoba); Alberta recently
amended the Matrimonial Property Act, including adopting an opt-out mechanism effective Jan. 2020.
Family Law Changes, ALBERTA.CA, https://www.alberta.ca/family-law-changes.aspx.
76
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with the other person.”82 It is a mixed directive composed of a firm rule (“at
least two years”) and a standard (“in a marriage-like relationship”). Couples
can opt out of these obligations by executing a contract that deviates from
these default rules, namely, the rules of division of family assets and order
to pay spousal support.
The assumed benefit of this opt-out method is that couples do not need,
on a case-by-case basis, to prove the nature of their relationships to incur
mutual obligations.83 Advocates contend that this approach promotes
certainty about what the law is, thereby minimizing litigation.84 Supporters
also depict opt-out systems as particularly supportive of women because
they protect women’s contribution to the growth of marital assets. This is
because in an opt-in system, caregivers would have no rights to an equitable
distribution of property acquired during the relationship at the relationship’s
end. In theory, the scheme protects the economically vulnerable party
(disproportionately female) by operating as a penalty default: a default that
shifts the burden to convey information about intentions on the party who
does not want an equal division of the assets.85 By imposing automatic
obligations on couples two years after they begin living together in a
marriage-like relationships, as the BC law does, lawmakers placed the
burden of revealing their true intention (vis-à-vis obligations) on the
economically stronger party, who has the incentive to opt out.86
The interest in an opt-out approach reaches beyond Canada and has been
the subject of fierce debate for many years.87 For instance, in 2002, the
American Law Institute’s recommendations for family-law reform included
adopting an opt-out approach under which couples who cohabit for three
years (fewer if they have a child) would be presumed “domestic partners,”
thus ascribing the same obligations as married couples have.88 Similarly, in
her influential book Unmarried Couples, Law, and Public Policy, Cynthia
82

Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25, § 3(1)(b) (Can.).
Andrew Morrison, Who is a Family: Cohabitation, Marriage, and the Redefinition of Family, 29
CAN. J. FAM. L. 381, 402–04 (2015).
84
BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 230; John-Paul Boyd, Reconstructing Domestic Relations: Improvements
and Innovations in British Columbia’s New Family Law Act, 33 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 353, 354 (2014).
85
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (explaining the concept of penalty default in a commercial context).
86
Cf., Natasha Bakht, A v B and Attorney General of Quebec (Eric v Lola)—The Implications for
Cohabiting Couples Outside Quebec, 28 CAN. J. FAM. L. 261, 272 (2014) (stating that an opt-out system
“is beneficial because it automatically protects those most vulnerable who would not have the resources
or knowledge to opt out, while still permitting those who wish to be independent as to property to retain
individual autonomy”).
87
See Heather Conway & Philip Girard, “No Place like Home”: The Search for a Legal Framework
for Cohabitants and the Family Home in Canada and Britain, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 715, 769–70 (2005)
(discussing legal reform in dealing with cohabitation in Canada and Britain); Matsumura, supra note 6,
at 2065–66 (discussing some of the debates in the United States about an opt-out approach); Scott &
Scott, supra note 12, at 343 n.189, 359 (noting that the ALI Principles “have gained little traction” and
that “American states have not adopted either the Principles or the domestic-partnership status”).
88
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at ch. 1.
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Bowman proposed that couples who live together for three years or have a
child should be considered spouses for all legal purposes.89 Both the
Institute’s and Bowman’s proposals encountered significant opposition. The
traditionalist response contends that such laws would lead to a decline in
marriages and confusion as to what each institution entails.90 Critical
scholars assert that ascribing obligations to couples against their will
“extends the shadow of marriage,” resulting in fewer variations and diversity
of relationship structures that differ from marriage.91 Janet Halley calls the
opt-out system “passive Marvin,” warning “that passive Marvin virtually
annexes the law of marriage.”92
As the opt-out approach is new, there is relatively little knowledge of
how it operates in practice. Robert Leckey’s caselaw analysis of post-reform
cases in BC and Saskatchewan found courts “breathing life into … the
‘marriage-like relationship’” standard while invoking their own biases and
normative judgments about what counts as “marriage-like.”93 It seems the
reform has not fully realized its goal of maximum predictability, with
Leckey concluding that “[d]isputes over the ‘spousal’ nature of a
cohabitation and that nature’s duration make it harder for cohabitants to
claim a share of family property than for married spouses.”94 He further finds
12% of pre-reform cases in BC and Saskatchewan included disputes about
the nature of the parties’ relationship, a proportion that grew to 30% postreform.95 Overall, however, other than this shift, “there was no radical
change in the population of litigants” pre- and post-reform, and “[t]here is
little change regarding the sexes of the parties, their ages, their economic
activities . . . the presence of children, and the average and median durations
of their unions.”96 The comparison also suggests that post-reform courts
awarded larger amounts, although post-reform data are derived from only

89

BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 223–38.
See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation,
42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 325, 331 (2008) (arguing against the ALI proposal and other conscriptive schemes);
Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s “Domestic
Partners” Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1193, 1199–1200 (2001) (arguing that the ALI proposal
“are stunningly excessive and inappropriate, simply imported wholesale from marriage law rather than
tailored to the characteristics of domestic partnerships. . . . Many provisions are overbroad, loose, and
ambiguous.”); Amy L. Wax, The Family Law Doctrine of Equivalence, 107 MICH. L. REV. 999, 1012
(2009) (“The alternatives to marriage create a plethora of choices and uncertainties. The understandings,
roles, and duties that attend the myriad liaisons short of marriage are murky, confused, conflicting, and
poorly defined.”)
91
Franke, supra note 49, at 2697 (“The intended effect of the ALI Principles is to enlarge marriage
law’s shadow.”).
92
Halley, supra note 37, at 20, 22.
93
Leckey, supra note 55, at 34–35.
94
Robert Leckey, Cohabitation, Female Sacrifice, and Judge-Made Law, 41 J. SOC. WELFARE &
FAM. L. 72, 74 (2019).
95
Leckey, supra note 81, at 139.
96
Id.
90

2021]

COMPULSORY CONJUGALITY

73

nineteen cases, potentially reflecting an incomplete picture.97 Considering
Leckey’s analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that the opt-out approach
adopted in BC and Saskatchewan has failed to achieve its goal of increased
certainty to the maximum extent (and thus did not minimize litigation)
because parties, more aggressively than before the reform, dispute that they
live in a “marriage-like” relationship.98
In conclusion, as nonmarriage is on the rise in countries worldwide, it
serves as a fertile ground for regulatory dilemmas and disagreements. The
opt-in and opt-out systems each include some benefits and carry some
significant drawbacks. In particular, they both try to balance the
predictability and protection of economically vulnerable parties on the one
hand and autonomy and diversity (of relationships) on the other. The opt-out
approach is harder to evaluate given its newness and the relative lack of
research. The next Part describes the methodology I used to test the effects
of an opt-out regime.
II. METHODS
Except for Leckey’s scholarship on the opt-out regimes in BC and
Saskatchewan, there is no literature exploring the repercussions that such a
scheme has on the legal system and the affected couples. Moreover,
Leckey’s work, as valuable as it is, tells us only about the way couples in an
opt-out system fared in court. We do not know how many couples did not
reach court in the first place because they predicted that their relationships
would or would not be considered “marriage-like,” or because they had other
misconceptions about the law. Put simply, caselaw analysis provides only
partial data about how the reform influenced the behaviors of couples before
relationship breakdowns. It also does not account for whether couples’
behavior changed because of the law, in terms of choosing whether to move
in together or whether to execute an agreement.
This study seeks to learn about the effect an opt-out scheme has on
couples outside the court. To use the words of Susan Silbey, “To know what
law does and how it works, we needed to know how ‘we the people’ might
be contributing to the law’s systemic effects, as well as to its
ineffectiveness.”99
Accordingly, my goal is to learn how couples in informal relationships
operate within an opt-out regime, particularly, how couples navigate the
terrain of relationship recognition, even if they are unaware of the law or do
not seek recourse from legal institutions. Fundamentally, the impact of a law
concerning couples’ legal recognition begins long before parties plan to split
97

Id. at 138.
Id. at 139 (“[L]aw reform appears to have increased disputes about the duration of the union or
the duration of cohabitation that could be qualified as ‘marriage-like’ or ‘as spouses.’”).
99
Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323, 326 (2005).
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up. Couples might decide one of the following: to postpone moving in
together to avoid or delay the law’s application; to execute a contract that
deviates from the default rules; to informally create obligations different
from those reflected by the default rules; or not to use the legal apparatus at
all upon separation. Couples might initially be ignorant of the law but later
use it as a bargaining tool when contemplating separation. Conversely, they
may assume that the law reflects the desirable or common norm, and they
should comply. Again, borrowing Silbey’s words, my interest extends beyond
an exploration of the law’s effectiveness, more broadly, to the “law’s effects.”100
From the perspective of legal realism, law is more than what the
lawmaker legislates and the judge adjudicates. Relying on the work of
Karl Llewellyn, and applying it in the context of relationship recognition,
Janet Halley maintains that legal realism views laws as operated and
practiced by all those who use them.101 The group of users includes
“everyone who alters his or her conduct or even his or her ideas to reflect
predictions about how legally authorized agents will behave.”102 Under this
understanding, the law is broader than the black-letter law: the law is its
effects. And the effects of the law of adult relationships kick in long before
a couple contemplates divorce or separation. Building on Lewis Kornhauser
and Robert Mnookin’s ever-important work, Halley points out that intimate
partners bargain “in the shadow of the law,” not only in divorce
settlement.103 Rather, the shadow of the default rules “permeates marriage
and may even be important in conditioning [couples’] interactions on their
first date.”104 This assumption—that the law of adult relationships can
metaphorically throw its shadow on relationships long before the breakup—
motivates this study and is also tested by this study.
Using BC as a real-world laboratory, the study’s primary objective is to
produce and report qualitative data about couples’ experiences of—and
attitudes toward—the current opt-out system. Through semi-structured
interviews with thirty couples who live in non-formalized relationships, I try
to get a better sense of the drawbacks and advantages of such a system and
how it has affected the couples’ behaviors (if at all).
My research assistant and I have conducted interviews with twentyseven different-sex and three same-sex couples.105 The participants’ ages
100

Id. at 328.
Halley, supra note 37, at 47–48 (relying on Llewellyn’s work in K. N. Llewellyn, Behind the
Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1932)).
102
Id. at 48 (emphasis omitted).
103
Halley, supra note 37, at 48–49 (citing Lewis Kornhauser & Robert H. Mnookin, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)).
104
Id. at 49.
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For the purpose of this Article, I did not separate the same- and different-sex couples because I
do not think that the experience of same-sex couples regarding knowing and understanding the law is
markedly different. Although there is a possibility that same-sex couples would be more egalitarian in
dividing property or would have greater familiarity with legal instruments like contracts, because of the
years without the possibility of marriage, the interviews suggested that they were not different from the
101
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ranged from twenty-one to forty-eight. Only four couples had a partner older
than forty, and in only one relationship were both partners older than forty.
Overall, most of the sample is composed of partners between the ages of
twenty-seven and thirty-five. Appendix A provides information about each
interviewee’s age, ethnicity (self-described), religion, and occupation.106
Seven couples had children, four of them from previous relationships and
three shared; some children lived in the household most of the time and some
with their custodial parent.
Criteria for inclusion in the study were couples who had lived two to
five years together in unmarried relationships. This was an important factor:
as these couples had moved in together when the FLA was already in force,
I was able to examine whether that law had any effect on their cohabitation
decisions. Interviews with couples residing in Vancouver were conducted
face-to-face at a time and location suggested by participants. Most
frequently, the interview was held at a coffee shop and occasionally in
people’s homes. Twelve interviews were held on Skype—with couples
living in other parts of BC (e.g., Whistler, Kamloops, Victoria).
Recruitment efforts changed over time. Initially, I used my own social
media accounts (I excluded first-circle relationships to interviewers) as well
as UBC’s and Allard School of Law’s accounts. I also placed ads in cafés
around Vancouver and in a community center. Later, I used Facebook ads
to reach out to larger populations, including people unconnected with my
circles. I compensated participants by giving each couple a $60 Amazon gift
card—an amount approved by UBC’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board.
Though the sample is diverse in several ways, most respondents were
highly educated, middle-income young professionals between the ages of
twenty-seven and thirty-five. All individuals except four have at least a
bachelor’s degree or are in the process of obtaining one. Participants mostly
fit into what are traditionally considered middle-class occupations,
according to social-class classification schemes.107 Further, with one
exception, all are nonreligious individuals. In sum, the sample is likely to
reflect common experiences among young, middle-class, highly educated,
and secular couples, a population that has, or is presumed to have, an interest
in property division and other financial obligations between partners. Early
adulthood is the ideal age for this study, as this population often represents
individuals who are in the primary years of building a career, accumulating
assets, and creating significant interdependency.108 This population, I assume,
others. In any event, my results would have remained the same if the sample included only the twentyseven different-sex couples.
106
See infra Appendix A for the sociodemographic of the interviewees.
107
See ROBERT ERIKSON & JOHN H. GOLDTHORPE, THE CONSTANT FLUX: A STUDY OF CLASS
MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 38–46 (1992) (providing a class schema).
108
See SHARON SASSLER & AMANDA JAYNE MILLER, COHABITATION NATION: GENDER, CLASS,
AND THE REMAKING OF RELATIONSHIPS 14 (2017) (justifying their decision to interview couples between
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will have relationship patterns of a joint venture, compared with older
couples who might be living on their retirement savings and be in their
second or third major relationship. Additionally, as I explain in Section
III.A, this population—of all populations—has the strongest reason to know
about the rules concerning obligations between partners.109
By the same token, the sample has some limitations: it primarily
contains well-educated individuals, in their midlife years, with a secular
orientation. I did not interview any elderly couples, recent immigrants from
Asia, or other racialized individuals, to name just a few of the relevant
groups left out. I fully acknowledge that these groups might (or even likely)
have different narratives and legal needs.110 In a future project, I aim to focus
on these populations. As well, the sampling of same-sex couples is too small
to draw any conclusions about differences between those couples and their
different-sex counterparts.111 Finally, I have only a small sample of couples
who raise children together. I believe that this is a strength of this research.
For one, the presumption of equal sharing and requirement of support is
more justifiable when one of the partners has made career sacrifices to raise
children. In other words, such a situation presents the least controversial
argument in favor of an opt-out regime.112 Indeed, most opt-out regimes
eighteen and thirty-six because they are at “the prime family formation years when young adults make
key decisions about work, marriage, and children”). See generally, Harry T. Reis, Yi-Cheng Lin, M.
Elizabeth Bennett, & John B. Nezlek, Change and Consistency in Social Participation During Early
Adulthood, 29 DEV. PSYCH. 633 (1993) (discussing the centrality of relationships to the lives of early adults).
109
See infra Section III.A (discussing the particular reasons the interviewees had an incentive to
know the default rules).
110
The mentioned groups have or might have a particular interest in regulating adult relationships.
Elderly couples constitute one of the largest groups of cohabitants in the United States. BOWMAN, supra
note 28, at 118–20. They have a lot to lose from an automatic presumption of marriage; for example, loss
of social benefits or alimony or disputes with children (their own or their partner’s) about inheritance.
Aloni, supra note 43, at 582–83. Recent immigrants from Asia comprise a big group of Canadian
residents that warrant scholarly attention. According to the 2016 census, over one-fifth of Canada’s
population is foreign-born: the majority (61.8%) of newcomers to Canada from 2011 to 2016 were born
in Asia. STAT. CAN., IMMIGRATION AND ETHNOCULTURAL DIVERSITY: KEY RESULTS FROM THE 2016
CENSUS (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/171025/dq171025b-eng.htm
[hereinafter STATISTICS CANADA: IMMIGRATION]. The 2006 Canadian census found that
living arrangements vary by ethnocultural group. Anne Milan, Leslie-Anne Keown & Covadonga Robles
Urquijo, Families, Living Arrangements, and Unpaid Work, in WOMEN IN CANADA: A GENDER-BASED
STATISTICAL REPORT 18 (2011), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-503-x/2010001/article/11546eng.htm. In the United States, immigrant groups have also struggled to cope with the law of unmarried
couples; they came with their own understandings of what constitutes a marriage or a union—a situation
leading to confusion and injustice. BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 114–16.
111
For recent studies of the different ways same-sex married couples divide housework and
conceive of their obligations, see, for example, Suzanne A. Kim & Edward Stein, Gender in the Context
of Same-Sex Divorce and Relationship Dissolution, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 384, 388–89 (2018); KENNETH
MATOS, FAMS. & WORK INST., MODERN FAMILIES: SAME- AND DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES NEGOTIATING
AT HOME 7–10 (2015), http://www.familiesandwork.org/downloads/modern-families.pdf; Melanie E.
Brewster, Lesbian Women and Household Labor Division: A Systematic Review of Scholarly Research
from 2000 to 2015, 21 J. LESBIAN STUD. 47, 63–65 (2017).
112
See, e.g., Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, The Costs of Raising Children: Toward a Theory of Financial
Obligations Between Co-Parents, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 179, 190 (2012) (arguing that “the
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create a special rule for people who raise children together (i.e., waive the
requirement of living together two years before the presumption arises).
Second, the number of adults who live without children in the United States
and Canada is growing exponentially, and it is interesting to learn how
norms of sharing operate in such a situation.113 Nevertheless, the opt-out
regimes are not limited to couples who have children, but they apply to
childless couples regardless.
Vancouver—along with the other locations—is ideal for such a study
because it is one of the most expensive real-property markets in North
America.114 It is reasonable to assume that couples with even a small interest
in real property will be motivated to respond to laws concerning division of
properties. Vancouver is also an immigrant city, with a little over 40% of its
population composed of newcomers.115 As the interviews confirm, coupleship
recognition is linked to immigration processes.
The BC experience can provide a valuable lesson to the United States.
In terms of recognizing spouses and unmarried couples, Canadian and
American family law systems share similar principles.116 Scholarly and
public debates about the recognition of informal relationships raise the same
concerns and assumptions.117 They both have a mix of federal and provincial
or state law. Further, there is no reason to believe couples’ experiences in
BC would differ from those in the United States.118 While there are pertinent
obligations created between adults by virtue of their joint parenthood should not be limited to the activity
of parenting, but rather extend to financial obligations that they owe one another.”).
113
See, e.g., Emily Schondelmyer, Fewer Married Households and More Living Alone, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2017/08/more-adults-living-withoutchildren.html.
114
Jessica Dorfmann, New Wealth Seeks a “Home”: The Global Rise of the Hedge City, 36 HARV.
INT’L REV. 4, 4 (2015).
115
STATISTICS CANADA: IMMIGRATION, supra note 110.
116
Much of the law concerning informal relationships relies on contractual principles, such as
requirements of formalities, implied contracts, and principles of unjust enrichment. The United States
and Canadian systems, with the exceptions of Louisiana and Quebec, share the common-law principles
pertaining to contracts between intimate partners.
117
The societal and legal issues concerning increased cohabitation in the United States and Canada
have long been compared. See, e.g., Pamela J. Smock & Sanjiv Gupta, Cohabitation in Contemporary
North America, in JUST LIVING TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONS OF COHABITATION ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN,
AND SOCIAL POLICY 48, 48 (Alan Booth & Ann C. Crouter eds., 2002) (analyzing the role of unmarried
cohabitation in Canada and the United States side-by-side).
118
There are significant differences in Canada and the United States about the types of benefits
attached to marriage, such as health insurance and taxation. In Canada, fewer attributes are connected to
marriage. There are also differences when it comes to the level of religiosity of the populations. However,
regarding legal obligations between the partners upon breakup, the differences are minor. It is still the
case, as I detailed before, that in Canada (like in the United States), the creation of obligations between
partners depends on the recognition of their relationships as marital or marital-like.
Most importantly, the reality is that in the United States, as in Canada, there is a growing societal
need to craft family law that responds to the situation at hand. The number of divorces, nonmarital unions,
and children born to unmarried parents necessitates a response from the courts and, eventually, the
political system. While some in the United States attach greater importance to marriage than Canadians
do, the values and attitudes in the United States concerning family life are changing rapidly, making the
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differences concerning the importance of marriage between populations in
both countries, there are no germane differences in the way that couples
discuss (or do not discuss) obligations, the problems with entering into
contracts among intimate couples, the rationales in protecting the investment
of the primary care provider in the relationships, the societal expectations
about norms of sharing the assets of the relationships, and the
misconceptions that couples have about the law.119 There are also no
applicable differences in the values and considerations that underpin the law
in this area.120
I and my research assistant, Adam Yang Vanzala, a sociology PhD
candidate, conducted the interviews. I contemplated whether to interview
the partners in each couple together or separately (but simultaneously),
noting that Sharon Sassler and Amanda Miller recently chose to interview
partners separately to “assess partner similarities and differences in
responses.”121 While separately interviewing partners provides more candid
answers and exposes conflicting narratives, I nevertheless chose to interview
partners together, as I was particularly interested in identifying points of
agreement and contention between them. Observing the partners’ reactions
to each other’s statements on recognition added a clarifying dimension to
the interviews. Though each individual may have tailored their responses to
please their partner or to mitigate any potentially uncomfortable moments,
some topics evoked a considerable amount of disagreement as well as
resonance. Therefore, interviewing partners together allowed us to identify
clear points of agreement and even contention between them. When
answering the questions, I noticed individuals relied on their partner for
recall and frequently corrected each other when something one partner
mentioned did not correspond to the other’s account. Separate interviews
might not reflect how things happen in their everyday lives, something only
naturalistic observation could answer, but it provides a better snapshot of
people’s relationship dynamics. Using this methodology also allowed us to
combine the interdisciplinary skills of legal and sociological training.
The interview consisted of a semi-structured, open-ended format.
Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and initially analyzed using an opencoding strategy to identify emerging themes. I started the interview with
experience in Canada highly relevant.
119
For discussion on U.S. couples’ knowledge about their legal obligations, see Ira Mark Ellman &
Sanford L. Braver, Should Marriage Matter?, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS 170, 171–72 (Marsha
Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012) (describing U.K. and U.S. studies about couples’ understanding
of the law and concluding that legal misconceptions are prevalent and that couples do not focus on legal
aspects of their relationships).
120
Indeed, as the ALI Principles state, some U.S. jurisdictions already follow the BC model:
“Although not always articulated in this way, several American jurisdictions follow a status approach
similar to that adopted in this section, as do several Canadian provinces . . . .” ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 4, at § 6.03.
121
SASSLER & MILLER, supra note 108, at 199.
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questions concerning the pre-cohabitation period, the reasons the couple
moved in together, the timing of moving in together, and the transition
period from dating to cohabiting. Without asking directly at this point, I used
this early questioning to gauge whether the law played any role in their
decision to move in together or not to do so. I then asked a set of questions
regarding the division of housework labor, followed by queries about
sharing financial expenses and about other economic aspects of their
relationships (e.g., “How are housing costs divided between the two of you?
How much has living together improved the economic well-being of each
one of you?”).
Next, I asked couples about their plans for the future: what are their
long-term plans; whether they want to have children; and whether they
intend to stay in the same place in the near future. I did this to learn a bit
more about the level of commitment the couple has. I then asked about the
legal obligations between the partners: whether they have made any formal
or informal agreement about the division of property or support; whether
they know the law; what they think the law says; and whether the law reflects
their understanding of their relationships. I further asked whether they knew
about the law when they moved in together and if they think their
relationship meets the definition of “marriage-like.” In the final stage, before
collecting demographic data, I tried to get further information about the
relationship’s nature and particularly about each couple’s decision not to get
married. Overall, I gathered a considerable data pool that increases
knowledge about many aspects of cohabiting couples. Some of the results—
those about unmarried couples in an opt-out regime—are discussed in the
following Part.
III. ASCRIPTION TROUBLE
This Part discusses the major findings of the qualitative study and draws
on them to analyze the effects of the opt-out model. Section A describes the
engagement of the couples with the law. Section B uses the interviewees’
experiences to assess the level of ascription. Section C examines the degree
to which couples’ behaviors and expectations conform with the equalsharing presumption that defaults supply. Section D enquires into the
constitutive impact that the law has on couples who live under this regime.
A. The Choice of Defaults
Couples in my sample had an abysmal understanding of the law, a hard
time comprehending the law if they tried, difficulties discussing their
obligations with one another, and challenges in executing contracts. This
Section reports what I learned from the interviews regarding these aspects.
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1. Knowing and Understanding the Law
To better understand whether couples can opt out from default regimes,
we need to know whether they are aware of the automatic obligations that
their relationships raise.
The study finds that couples’ degree of familiarity with and
understanding of the law is tenuous. A third of the couples (ten out of thirty)
were completely ignorant about the law’s existence or knew so little as can
be characterized as nonexistent. When asked if they knew anything about
the law concerning their obligations, they responded that they knew nothing.
Over time, I found out that many couples who initially said that they knew
nothing actually knew more than they realized, so I always followed up with
probing questions (such as, “Do you know whether you have any financial
obligations vis-à-vis one another upon breakup?”) to examine real levels of
knowledge. This third expressed ignorance about the laws governing their
mutual obligations even after I probed.
In only seven out of the thirty couples, both partners had a good
understanding of the law; in two other couples, only one partner had a good
understanding. By “good understanding,” I mean an awareness that the
couple was recognized as spouses automatically, without taking any
affirmative steps. The rest of the couples—thirteen out of thirty—had
different degrees of understanding of the law but fell into one or more
common mistakes, which I discuss below.
One such mistake was not realizing they could opt out of the law’s
application regarding their mutual financial obligations. Namely, in five
couples, at least one partner (and typically both) thought that the two years
was a mandatory regime, without a way out. Eve122 (twenty-nine), who knew
the law rather well, answered, “I did not know you could opt out of it, I kind
of thought it was a—it automatically happened, regardless.” Jessica (thirtythree) mentioned that she “wasn’t aware you could opt out or go to a notary
or whatever and have something formalized there, so effectively a prenup.”
The opposite misunderstanding, however, was much more common:
approximately a quarter of the interviewees mistakenly expressed the idea
that they needed to “apply” in order to be considered “spouses” or “common
law” partners (in other words, they believed they were living under an optin regime).123 Danny (twenty-five), an urban-gardener with a master’s
degree in public policy, had a typical response: “I have a vague
122

Eve is not her real name; all interviewees’ names used herein are aliases.
Couples are right that triggering the law’s application requires one of the partners to claim
property rights or support from the other partner or to apply to court. Yet, at least for some federal
purposes, these couples ought to choose the designation of “living common law” if they live in conjugal
relationships. See, e.g., Old Age Security Act, RSC 1985, c-9, S 2 (Can.) (“common-law partner, in
relation to an individual, means a person who is cohabiting with the individual in a conjugal relationship
. . . .”). Further, theoretically, the entitlement to an equal share in a partner’s property is created without
any affirmative step, even if the partners do not seek to exercise their right.
123
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understanding of common law [relationships] in general and applying for
that, which we haven’t done.”
Couples with some understanding of the law, or knowledge about its
existence, typically heard about it from friends and sometimes from family
or just had a general idea about it. Jenny’s response is typical: “I have a
general idea, I don’t know where I learned this, but like I have a general
sense that unmarried couples have virtually the same rights as married
couples. That’s just what I’ve been told or what I’ve heard on the street . . . .”
Even couples with a solid legal understanding fell into the other
common mistake I observed: they confused how long it takes to be
considered “common-law partners” for federal purposes (after living in a
“conjugal relationship” for one year) with how long it takes to be considered
“spouses” for provincial purposes (after two years, in BC).124 Eight couples
in the interviews mixed up the federal and the provincial time requirements.
As one partner with a basic understanding of the law stated, “It’s kind of
confusing, too, because there are some things that say you’re common law
after one year and then there’s some things that say you’re common law after
two years, so I’m not really sure how that’s decided.” While the problem of
different timelines at the federal and provincial levels is unique to Canada,
there is a good chance that similar confusions will occur in the United States.125
If you think that being confused about the timing is not a big deal,
consider the following story. Tim and Tommy, a same-sex couple, moved
from Scotland to BC in 2017. Tim, a native English speaker with a PhD in
chemistry, was a permanent resident of Canada and, on that basis, aimed to
sponsor Tommy. The problem was that when Tim first entered Canada, he
checked the box for “single,” despite having lived together with Tommy for
thirteen months (and hence already considered in a conjugal relationship for
one year). He did this because they thought their relationship was only
federally recognized after two years. “We thought it took two years cause
when you Google it, it says British Columbia common law, two years, so we
thought there was a special situation for this province only—that overruled
the federal one which said one year only.” The situation was, then, that Tim
was “accidentally lying” (his words), because he was confused between the
two different time-dependent definitions. After consulting a lawyer, and
paying much for such guidance, Tommy had to apply for permanent
residency on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, only because of, as
Tim says, “an honest mistake cause, basically, you ticked the wrong box”—
124
Margrit Eichler, Common-Law Unions in Canada, CAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Sept. 21, 2016),
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/common-law-unions-in-canada#. See also Family
Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25 § 3(1)(b)(i) (Can.) (defining a “spouse” as a person who “has lived with
another person in a marriage-like relationship, and has done so for a continuous period of at least 2 years”).
125
In the United States, marital status matters at the federal and state level and each can define
eligible marriages differently. For why and how the federal government shapes family law, see Courtney
G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787, 788 (2015).

82

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1

even though, when one looks up the definition online, “it literally says two
years.” The consequences of this mistake are devastating: processing such
an application can take up to twenty-nine months. Tim and Tommy applied
a year ago; during this time, Tommy has not been allowed to work or leave
the country, so Tim serves as the sole provider.
When BC promulgated the reform, legislators noted, “During the
consultation period, feedback indicated that many unmarried couples now
are under the mistaken belief that, after two years, they are treated the same
as married couples and are entitled to division of property if they separate.
This misunderstanding causes significant disadvantage.”126 The findings call
into question the data that the BC lawmakers relied on when deliberating
about adopting an opt-out approach. It is hard to believe that before the BC
law was passed couples thought they were deemed married after two years
of cohabitation—given that, even now, when it is the law, they have little
idea that they are considered spouses. Another rationale for the reform was
harmonization: making the law simpler by using the same period as various
other acts.127 As this study evidenced, this objective has not been achieved,
as the most important distinction—the one between the federal and the
provincial laws—is often confused.
Understanding the law is difficult even for those who try hard to do so.
Two partners, Romeo (twenty-one) and Juliet (twenty-one), are students at
UBC in highly competitive programs; they are native English speakers who
come across as highly articulate. When they were close to reaching their
two-year threshold, they tried to comprehend the law by researching both
BC and federal websites. Despite being sophisticated readers and
researchers, they were unable to grasp the relevant laws fully. As Romeo
described, “I remember that I had a bit of trouble figuring out whether
common law was federal or provincial law.” Further, he “also had trouble
figuring out whether it was something that you could decide or declare or
apply for versus whether it was forced upon you.” Both of them reported
frustration at being unable to decipher these legal regimes, despite the
noteworthy effort.
Similarly, Ryan (thirty-five), whose job as a union negotiator often
includes engaging with legal materials, and Jessica (thirty-three), an
occupational therapist, described their frustration and confusion in trying to
understand the law:
Jessica: I remember doing some research about when, what is
the timeline for when you’re considered common law because
I have heard different things from different friends where [ ]
126
Family Law Act Questions and Answers, GOV’T OF B.C. 7 (Apr. 11, 2013),
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/about-bc-justice-system/legislationpolicy/fla/faq.pdf.
127
Id.
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some people said six months . . . and then other stuff was two
years, and it was just really unclear if there was a time limit
kind of thing. . . . And I wanted to get an idea of what sort of
rights and obligations that did provide. [I] work in healthcare,
I’m quite concerned with healthcare matters, and I wanted to
know . . . if I’m someone’s common-law partner am I their
next of kin as a spouse would be, can I make healthcare
decisions for them . . . ? And I did a lot of Googling at the time
and I never really felt confident in the information that I was
able to get; it was just very unclear at that time . . . .
Ryan: And I would say something very similar, which is that
I had trouble figuring out what was sort of covered by
provincial law and what might be federal.
Many couples had good reasons to know the law (regarding their mutual
obligations), discuss the law, and reach some shared understanding of their
mutual obligations. The couples’ responses often revealed that they had
intended to keep some properties out of their partner’s reach. One-third of
the couples had what I characterize as a “strong interest” in clarifying their
legal position (since they own realty together) or in excluding property from
the shared pool. Further, a few couples had title to the property under only
one of the partners’ names (e.g., one partner did not have a permanent
residency when they purchased or was not qualified to take a mortgage). In
addition to co-owning property, one couple had a business for which one
serves as the de facto CEO and the other as the service provider. Further, a
few interviewees had a strong interest and stated intention not to share the
liability of their partner’s debt.
Another third of the couples I interviewed had what I characterize as a
“moderate interest” in clarifying their legal obligations, as they owned
significant assets from before the relationships. While property bought
before a relationship is separate under BC law (i.e., is excluded from family
property and is not part of the distribution pool),128 transmutations of
property occurred in many of these couples’ dealings—and tracing the
origins of contributions is complex.129 For instance, one partner moved into
the apartment that her partner owned; recently, they sold it and purchased a
new property together. Another partner sold shares she owned and bought
property while together with a partner (appreciation on such property is
considered marital property130). Additionally, while the assets purchased
before the relationships are excluded, their appreciation is part of the
divisible family property, and some partners might want to avoid this. Many
interviewees were ignorant about this point. Others contributed to their
128

Family Law Act § 85(1)(a).
Id. at § 85(1)(g) (tracing of excluded property).
130
Id. at § 84(1)(a), 84(2)(g).
129
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retirement savings while together (which makes such savings part of the
family property131), co-owned a car, or both. All these people had good
reasons to sort out their obligations in advance. In any event, due to the
vagueness, ambiguities, and uncertainties of the law of property division and
of spousal support, it is wise for those with property to formalize their legal
obligations.132
2. Cognitive Bias and Overoptimism
Notwithstanding these incentives to put their legal rights and
responsibilities in order, couples have given this little thought or have had
very unclear understandings about how or why it is relevant to them.
Daniella (thirty-six), a sophisticated, business-oriented person,
acknowledged that she and her partner’s properties are “a giant mess. If we
ever get separated it will be a big battle.” Yet, Yossi, her forty-year-old
partner, stated that he “didn’t really think about [their obligations].”
Most couples did not discuss obligations directly, due to a combination
of trust, naïveté, and dislike of what they felt was mixing the personal with
business. Despite having a business together and being experienced with
buying and selling properties, Daniella and Yossi felt mingling love with
domestic agreements does not make sense. Yossi explained that signing a
contract is “like business, bring[ing] a business into a relationship.” Danielle
mentioned that her mother asked her whether she would sign a contract, as
she “was coming into the relationship with a lot more assets than [Yossi].”
Yet, she “figured, even though [Yossi] had a lot more debt and was not
making money yet, [he] had potential, so [it’s] not [like he was] going to try
to steal money from me.” Another female interviewee stated: “I guess we
just haven’t really thought a lot about, you know, something as trivial as
breaking up or like one of us dying, for example.”
Erin (twenty-eight) is a lawyer who owns the apartment she lives in with
her partner, Williams (twenty-eight), an elementary school teacher. Their
informal agreement is that Williams is not entitled to any share of the
property, including its appreciation. When they moved in together, Erin
drafted a contract but eventually put it aside. When I asked her why she did
this, she replied:
Erin: I don’t know, I just figured that he’s a really reasonable
person, and you know.
Williams: I believe in good karma.
Erin: I mean, I just don’t think that he’d go after me.
131

Id. at § 84(2)(e).
See JEFFREY BEHRENDT, THE ONLY COHABITATION AGREEMENT GUIDE YOU’LL EVER NEED:
A CANADIAN LAWYER EXPLAINS ALL (2016) (noting that there are several good reasons to enter into a
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Williams: If things went, went bad, that would just be a
terrible thing to do.
Earlier studies have found that married couples are too optimistic or too
trusting to discuss financial topics that touch on possible breakup and to
negotiate them effectively or are embarrassed to raise such issues with their
partners.133 The interviews track similar patterns within cohabiting couples.
Tim, for example, expressed, “We don’t foresee ourselves having any issues
about breaking up or anything like that cause we’re too strong
communication-wise, and we anticipate arguments before we even have
them, we’re really academic in that, so . . . .” Yet, Tim, like other
interviewees, is at greater risk of separation than married couples, as evident
by the high separation rates among unmarried couples versus married.134
Indeed, one study found that even in Quebec, the province with the highest
cohabitation rate and the strongest acceptance of cohabitation as a marriage
alternative, informal cohabitations remain more unstable than marriages.135
In addition, married partners can afford some degree of optimism because
they assume that the law duly protects them in case of divorce. But it is
evident that at least half of the couples I interviewed did not assume the
protection of the law in case of a breakup—so they do not have similar
grounds to feel that the law adequately protects them.
Couples not only underestimated their likelihood of breakup, but they
were also highly optimistic about having an easy, clean separation. Despite
experiencing complex divorces for both partners’ parents, Antonio (thirty)
thought it would be different for them: “Now for me, it’s just easy, you know
50/50, boom, if that had to happen.” Another couple, both engineers in their
early thirties, shared a similar belief, as the male partner articulated: “We
both have some respect, and trust each other, and . . . if we separated, it
would be on . . . good terms, and we wouldn’t fight each other over things
like a vehicle.” Likewise, Molly (thirty-three) expressed a similar sentiment
when stating, “I have a very hard time picturing a situation that would get,
like, super acrimonious . . . obviously that happens all the time, but I think
133
See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions
and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 444 (1993) (discussing
surveyed couples’ unrealistically positive projections for their own marital futures); Heather Mahar, Why
Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? 2 (Harvard L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. For L., Econ., and Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 436, 2003), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/436.pdf
(concluding that the death of premarital agreements can be explained by undue optimism regarding the
unlikelihood of divorce and concerns that discussions around a prenuptial agreement suggest uncertainty
about the success of one’s marriage).
134
According to the 2011 General Social Survey on Families, out of five million individuals who
ended relationships between 1990 and 2010, 49% dissolved a common-law relationship, and 44%
dissolved a marriage. Maire Sinha, Parenting and Child Support After Separation or Divorce,
in SPOTLIGHT ON CANADIANS: RESULTS FROM THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY 1, 5 (2014).
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France-Pascale Ménard, What Makes It Fall Apart? The Determinants of the Dissolution of
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we’re different.” Couples who reflect on their trust and naiveté often
manifested some kind of ambivalence; after sharing a sentiment of trust, they
proceeded with a statement of justification or self-doubt. “I don’t care what
the law says. And maybe that’s ignorant and naïve,” stated Kelley. Then she
acknowledged, “But again, we’re in a good place, right, so that is why the
law is here.”136
Only a small fraction of the couples had discussed the division of
property in case of a breakup. One partner, twenty-nine years old from
Victoria, described the motivation to discuss things as follows: “We’ve had
conversations before because we’re not married, so it’s not like we have a
formal arrangement of our finances. If something were to happen and we
separated, it’s, well, what are we going to do? So ‘C’ and I have talked about it.”
Ryan and Jessica (the union negotiator and occupational therapist) were
engaged in a long process of clarifying their mutual obligations. One main
motivation for this is that Jessica is divorced and wanted to ensure her
independence. They have exchanged emails about the possible legal
arrangement they would like to see, taking a very realistic approach. And
although Jessica recounted the process as involving a “somewhat strange
conversation about hypothetical reasons [to break up],” both partners
eventually described the results as satisfying. Ryan explained the rationale
for the agreement as follows:
I felt good about it for the idea that we, presumably if we broke
up, we might not like each other in that moment, we like each
other now, we could have sort of respectful conversation now
about what we wanted, and that might be easier to do now than
it would be later.
Jessica shared a similar sentiment:
I felt really good, . . . I remember joking about this afterwards
that even though we spent like half that day talking about what
if we broke up, the idea that we could have that conversation
just made me feel like more secure and, and confident in the
relationship . . . .
Although their experience was the exception, a few other couples had
frank discussions about the legal arrangement. The next Section describes
their attitudes toward a formal contract.
3. The Problems with Executing a Contract
Overall, only seven couples contemplated a contract. Merely two
136
Separation from cohabiting relationships is likely to be at least as acrimonious as separation
from divorce. One Australian study found that separated cohabiting parents reported more conflict than
divorced parents and that ending cohabiting relationships “clearly does not prevent severe separation
adjustment problems.” W. Kim Halford & Susie Sweeper, Trajectories of Adjustment to Couple
Relationship Separation, 52 FAM. PROCESS 228, 240 (2013).
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executed a formal one, and two others wrote an informal one. The couples’
diverse experiences exemplify the barriers that couples who overcome the
cognitive bias face when wishing to opt out.
When I asked Ryan and Jessica why they did not consult a lawyer and
formalize their contract, they answered that “cost was a big part of it.” Kelley
(forty-three) and Megan (forty-eight) are another couple that took steps
toward writing a contract but did not formalize it. The problem is that a court
might not enforce the contract because it did not comply with the formalities
that guarantee the strongest protection from court intervention in setting
aside the contract. The couple worked on a draft contract that arranged their
relative ownership in their shared home (the title is only in Megan’s name).
At the time of the interview, this draft remained on their computer, unsigned.
BC law requires a cohabitation agreement regarding the division of property
and debt be signed by both partners and witnessed by another person.137
Because their agreement does not follow the required formalities, a court
might or might not adhere to it—the law gives courts maximum discretion
in such cases.138 When asked why they did not sign the agreement, they
responded that they “were out of money for legal advice.” This is a telling
response, as the law in BC does not require independent legal advice as a
condition for enforceability. The response sheds light on the difficulty in
entering into a contract without guidance.
Other couples did not even consider writing an informal document
because one of the partners resisted. Bertha (thirty) reported that they had
“not sat down and talked to anyone or written anything out or signed any
documents” and that she “wish[ed] we did, personally.” According to
Bertha, her partner Wakeford (forty-two) had “pushed back” against her idea
to hire a lawyer because he thought “they’re overpriced and that we are smart
people.” On his side, Wakeford explained that he is the economically
vulnerable party, and an agreement would be on his behalf. Thus, he
claimed:
When it’s my assets on the line, then I’m less inclined to say
we need a formal contract. For instance, like buying a vehicle
together—it’s registered and titled to her, so I’m the only one
vulnerable, but I feel like if that was reversed, I definitely
would not begrudge a more formal contract because she
requires it. I would be completely open to that.
Two couples shared a mutual intention to enter into a contract and did
not execute one, at least not a binding one. One of those couples—the
engineers—had attorney friends who advised them to enter into a contract
and instructed them how. And while both partners “understood that it would
137
138
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be good to have something on paper . . . we just didn’t have time for it.”
Kemala (thirty) and Ethan (thirty-one) also wanted to enter into an
agreement, but a few things stood in their way. Most importantly, they
realized that there is not much to contract around because they do not own
any property. Thus, Ethan explained, it became “low priority, we haven’t
really put anything into place, we haven’t contacted a lawyer. I don’t even
know what we would put in it.” Ethan then clarified that the reason he did
not push to execute an agreement is that, because his main asset is under sole
proprietorship, Kemala “can’t really claim half of that, it’s just me, or maybe
I don’t know.” His last assertion is correct: he does not know—there is no
reason to treat sole proprietorship as an excluded property.
Surprisingly or not (because it goes against the stereotype), the two
couples who executed a contract did it to protect the female partner’s
property. Nivaan (twenty-six), a commercial banker, and her partner, Diter
(twenty-nine), working for a software company, executed a contract that
guarantees that Nivaan is the sole owner of the property they live in. Nivaan
is an only child, and her parents paid for the down-payment on the
apartment. Diter is not entitled to share from the appreciation of the property.
Their contract, then, deviates from the default rules of property division.
They have both had independent legal advice. Olivia (twenty-eight) and
Logan (twenty-five) are another couple who entered into a formalized
agreement. Olivia inherited a sum of money, which she used to buy the
apartment they live in. Their contract replicates the default rules. The
purpose of the contract was to clarify her ownership—including her sole
ownership in a trust account—and to guarantee, in the words of Logan, “a
fair and clean split.”
Most couples who contemplated an agreement, then, did not form a
binding agreement. The two who executed a contract did this to secure the
property owner’s rights in the living space they were sharing. Both couples
relied on legal advice.
In conclusion, we have so far observed, on one end of the spectrum,
couples who know a nominal amount about the law and hold inaccurate
perceptions about their legal position; most commonly, they think they need
to apply for recognition as spouses, or they are confused about the time at
which obligations automatically attach to their relationships. On the other
end of the spectrum, we find couples who believe that they cannot opt out
or who find the process of contracting too onerous. In addition, we witnessed
cognitive biases that inhere in such relationships: partners’ overestimation
of their chances of staying together, expectations of a clean breakup,
combined with couples’ limited ability to engage with each other on these topics.
B. The Defaults of Choice
Based on the findings so far, I suggest that BC’s opt-out regime, as it
currently operates, is highly ascriptive in its nature. For those who are
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unaware of the law altogether, or who think they must take active steps to
enjoy its protection, the law imposes obligations “by surprise.” As one
interviewee observed, some people “kind of get trapped into that law without
really knowing the details.” Danny articulated a similar attitude: “I don’t
have an issue with this law as I understand it now, but I have an issue with
not knowing about it, having lived in BC for years.”
I do not claim that the law imposes obligations that all couples would
find unreasonable or that are different from what they would have expected
anyway. Rather, scholars who support an opt-out approach often respond to
critiques about the harm to the autonomy of unmarried couples by stating,
“[a]s with marriages, if the parties do not like the norm, they may contract
around it.”139 But the assertion that couples can easily exercise choice by
opting out, that this law minimally affects them, is mistaken. Further, the
assumption that not contracting out indicates implicit agreement to a sharing
regime is just as wrong as the argument that couples indicate their consent
to the default rules by not opting in.
In cases where residents do not know the law, BC’s degree of ascription
serves as an offense to autonomy and to the law’s legitimacy. Some scholars
react to this appraisal of autonomy violation by arguing that “[t]he flaw is
the premise that those who marry or do not marry accurately understand the
legally enforceable economic obligations that each will have towards the
other. In [the United States] federal system, it is not possible for this
proposition to be true.”140 Married couples, as well, the argument goes, have
not consented to the default rules of financial obligations upon divorce
because they cannot possibly know them. Accordingly, inscription (on
unmarried couples) is based on a notion of consent similar to that which the
law assumes regarding support obligations for married couples.
What such a critique misses are the functions that formalities (such as
marriage) serve. While it is true that married couples often also do not know
the nitpicky rules of division of property and spousal support, the process
itself of getting married serves the cautionary aspect of formalities, which
does not exist in an opt-out model. Famously, Lon Fuller elucidated that one
role of formalities is to caution parties before entering into a commitment.141
Accordingly, the ritual of formalities—for example, signature or exchange
of consideration—ensures that the parties deliberate before entering into a
binding agreement. As Matsumura recently explained, “[c]hoice, especially
formal choice, can highlight the seriousness of the decision to become
married. The basic requirements of formal marriage in most states—
obtaining and recording a marriage license, often satisfying a waiting period,
and participating in an official ceremony—all serve this cautionary function.”142
139
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Formalities also serve to make the undertaking legitimate in the eyes of
the parties. Deliberation has a behavioral aspect. Parties are more willing to
commit to the undertaking and take it more seriously if they contemplate the
act. Formalities, according to David Hoffman and Zev Eigen, “are supposed
to signal to individuals that a privately made instrument of law (a contract)
bears the seal of the law’s formal approval, and hence the authority of
legitimate law stands behind it.”143 They suggest that the more a promisor
feels that the deal is legitimate, the more likely the chance that she will
respect her undertaking.144 Given the lack of formalities, couples may
perceive an opt-out system as illegitimate should they find themselves in a
contract for equal division of property and spousal support, particularly if
they wished to avoid that very situation or, as in the case of some
interviewees, are unaware that the law even exists. The feeling of
illegitimacy can evoke resistance. In family law cases, feelings of resistance
may increase acrimony among partners at separation, making the process of
division more antagonistic and affecting partners’ future interactions.145
Because some ex-partners continue to co-parent together or have other
reasons to remain cooperative, this sense of illegitimacy concerning the law
runs contrary to one of the basic principles of contemporary family law.146
Simultaneously, when couples do not know that they can opt out from
the default rules, or when opting out is too arduous, family law does not
serve its facilitative function. For Fuller, formalities play a facilitative role,
as they help channel parties to the form they must follow to create legally
binding obligations.147 For example, the writing requirement guides the
prospective promisor about the right way to enter into an agreement. Family
law scholarship has long emphasized facilitation as a primary function of
domestic relations law. Facilitation should “help people organize their lives
and affairs in the ways they prefer. Family law performs this ‘facilitative’
function by offering people the law’s services in entering and enforcing
contracts, by giving legal effect to their private arrangements.”148 Indeed, an
opt-out regime purports to serve this role, by posing clear requirements that
should guide couples about how to tailor their own arrangements and point
them to the specific form of opting out: a written, signed contract witnessed
by one person. In practice, however, the BC opt-out scheme fails to enable
143
David A. Hoffman & Zev J. Eigen, Contract Consideration and Behavior, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 351, 386 (2017).
144
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RELATIONSHIPS 91, 126 (2014) (discussing the negative effects of the adversarial system on any human
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feasible facilitation. Placing the burden to opt out on the couples, without
assistance and guidance about how to do it, and imposing formal
requirements for opting out that are rather stringent, facilitation functions
mainly for wealthy, sophisticated partners who can have an attorney’s
assistance. Setting a process of opting out that is quite laborious raises the
question of whether the law’s interest is in enabling facilitation or in making
alteration of the default grueling.149
The fact that most interviewees did not opt out is hardly surprising, as
the default rules in family law often serve as a de facto mandatory rule, or,
at least, a “super-sticky” default rule. Scholarship on contract theory has
documented the “stickiness” of default terms—or how parties to a contract
might not alter an undesirable default rule.150 A primary obstacle to
displacing a default term governing financial obligations is the partners’
cognitive bias and overoptimism. We have seen that even a trained lawyer
with a strong interest in entering an agreement with her partner backed up
eventually, so the hurdles to execute a contract are significant.
High transaction costs are another obvious explanation for the default’s
stickiness in the study’s case, for the process of executing a contract is
onerous. It is true that parties can, with little effort, download a boilerplate
contract. But, considering the complexity of asset division laws and spousal
support, they would be justified in consulting a lawyer. Further, the rituals—
the signature and witness requirements—serve as deterrents to a “do-ityourself” type of contract, like the one that Kelley and Megan did.
Other than the cost, the party who suggests altering the defaults might
be concerned about their partner’s response, and for good reason. As Omri
Ben-Shahar and John Pottow argue regarding a commercial contractual
scenario, “[N]o matter what the default practice is, a proposal to opt out of
it can raise a host of suspicions.”151 This is surely the case in a suggestion to
contract around defaults in the context of financial obligations between
intimate partners. If defaults are sticky for sophisticated commercial parties
or those with a less intimate connection, the defaults governing relationship
dissolution are practically adhesive. As such, the default is not a mere
“nudge”—a mechanism that steers couples toward a particular choice rather
than choosing for them.152 In reality, the default’s function is more akin to
mandatory rules than gentle guidance in one direction.
In conclusion, as it operates in the lives of unmarried couples, BC’s opt149
In Section III.C., I consider whether one objective of an opt-out regime is increasing the number
of individuals subject to the enforcement of private support obligations.
150
Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 19, at 655–60 (surveying previous scholarship on the
stickiness of default rules).
151
Id. at 653.
152
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HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 108–09 (2008) (discussing a possible change in default rule as a type
of “nudge”).
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out scheme leaves the choice to contract around the default rules quite
illusory. Unless the couples are wealthy enough to afford a lawyer or are
highly entrepreneurial, we can assume that most of them will remain married
by default, with little opportunity to design a different regime. One of the
fundamental problems that the law tried to address is that unmarried couples
did not contract about their obligations and thus found themselves without
protections at the end of their relationships. The opt-out regime did not solve
this matter but essentially placed the burden on those who wanted to avoid
the obligations.153 The same difficulties that existed with the previous
system still exist, although now they fall on those who might wish to deviate
from the default. To clarify, I do not argue that opt-out systems are
inherently ascriptive and autonomy-violating. Rather, in Parts IV and
Conclusion, I suggest some ways to reduce the level of ascription or at least
the adverse effects of ascription. However, the way that the BC system is
structured, which resembles similar suggested models in the United States,
makes active choosing fairly unlikely.
C. Majoritarian or Minoritarian Defaults
This Section enquires into whether, and to what extent, the default rules
mirror what most couples would have bargained had they been informed of
the rules. Put differently, I aim to understand better whether the law echoes
the common expectations of couples who live in unmarried relationships
about the nature of their commitments, and whether the law was too
autonomous in that regard and “march[ed] to its own drummer.”154
Law, it is axiomatic, derives its legitimacy from mirroring the cultural
dynamics and traditions of the time.155 Positive law often reflects a construct
of custom and practice, on the one hand, and morality, on the other. Most
positive laws are consistent with both: laws replicate society’s prevalent
attitudes and stem from reason and morality. Sometimes, however, “[l]aw
has . . . taken the lead in opposing or reforming prevailing customs or moral
norms.”156 From the premise that law “often reproduces norms, activities,
and relationships that exist independent of law,”157 I ask whether an opt-out
approach serves as a majoritarian default.
To learn about the couples’ attitudes toward the equal division of
property and spousal support, I investigated how they manage their current
finances and their opinions of the law that equalizes their duties to those of
married couples. In the first set of questions I asked how they divided their
housing costs (rent, mortgage, utilities). Living in an arrangement in which
153
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couples contribute to the household finances based on their relative income
(pro rata) or income pooling was a strong indication of a sharing regime and
interdependence. Conversely, choosing to calculate an exact amount that
each partner contributes and reimburse the other regularly was indicative of
a separate financial regime. Separate versus shared bank accounts was
another indication of the level of a couple’s economic independence and
interdependence, respectively. I also interpreted partners’ intentions to be
responsible to each other by their direct responses about whether they
thought the properties they accumulated while together should be divided
equally in the event of separation and whether they reached any formal or
informal agreement about financial obligations in case of a breakup. Other
indications of an equal-sharing regime include the creation of emotional
interconnection and long-term commitment.
1. The Sharers
Surprisingly, the defaults reflect the behavior and presumed or explicit
wishes of only about half of the interviewees. Namely, approximately half
of interviewees live together with some form of financial sharing and
economic interdependence.158 For this group, the defaults mimic what they
would have chosen if they were informed about the law and bargained about
their obligations. The law, then, is barely majoritarian.159 Only half of the
couples I interviewed believe that, upon dissolution, the partners should
equally divide the assets that the household added while the relationship was
still intact and should be obligated to pay spousal support.
I find this result surprising for two reasons. For one, another study—
although using quantitative methods—found stronger support for equal
division of property among unmarried cohabitants. In recently reported
research conducted in Alberta surveying 118 individuals who live in
common-law relationships, 76% of the respondents supported equalizing
division-of-property rules that pertain to married couples to apply to
unmarried couples, while 24% objected.160 Second, the participants in my
study belong to the group most likely to adopt sharing norms, as they are at
the prime age of planning to buy property and raise children. Indeed, the
great majority of couples said that their long-term plan was to buy real
property. Norms of sharing would likely be different if I had interviewed
158
In two cases, I had trouble characterizing the couples’ approach. In one couple, the male
interviewee avoided answering directly, suggesting he likely does not support equal sharing; and,
regardless, the relationship showed some degree of financial separation and noncommitment. Another
couple was very transparent but hesitated and had conflicting considerations.
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elderly couples or couples with lower incomes and more couples with shared
children in their household.161
For some participants, it was easy to justify the equal division, as they
based their relationships on joint venture principles: the law “make[s] sense
because since we’ve been together, we’ve made money together, and all the
money we’ve made on the real estate was together,” Daniella explained.
Likewise, Richard (twenty-nine), Courtney’s partner (thirty), had
reservations about spousal support. Still, he easily justified the norm of equal
division and eventually even support obligations because “the argument that
you spend so much of your time together and . . . living together, I think,
supersedes a lot of the [arguments against equal division].” Bertha described
a typical process in which a couple begins as two independent individuals,
and gradually, finances become more intertwined. She reported that “our
independent finances have been kind of just independently but . . . in the
future . . . we think of our finances as merging, like when we consider buying
or renting a future home, we consider buying it together . . . .”
Predictably, the couples who raise children together full time were able
to articulate their sharing presumption without effort or hesitation. As Emma
(thirty-six) elucidated, “I feel like as soon as you have a child and you live
together . . . yes, you’re married, like a child is probably the biggest
commitment anybody would ever make.” Ethan and Kemala do not have
children. But the option of having them one day helped them to make sense
of the law. Ethan reasoned that “I get the logic behind it that, if someone
took care of the kid when the other person worked, just because they didn’t
pay the mortgage doesn’t mean they don’t have any right to the property.”
At the same time, raising a child when only one of the partners is a legal
parent can make the sharing presumption more doubtful. Wakeford, who is
divorced, has joint custody, and lives with Bertha, acknowledged that equal
sharing is more complicated because “we’ve always had some concession,
because I have a child, that we don’t—well, so far, we don’t consider that 50/50.”
Some sharers expressed the idea that the law’s timeline (two years) kicks
in too late.162 For them, the law mirrors their arrangement but might
commence later than their needs arise. Two couples moved in together after
long periods of dating (three years in one instance and six in the other) and
bought property together right away. For a third couple, the female partner
moved from England to live with her partner, and after a few months, they
bought a home together. In all these cases, the two-year rule rendered the
law underinclusive, as the couples adopted sharing regimes before two years
of living together. Kelley and Megan, who dated for six years prior to
161
Elderly couples often do not get married because of pressure from their children to avoid
comingling finances and thus endangering the children’s inheritance. There are other incentives to avoid
sharing, such as possible loss of state benefits and spousal support. See Aloni, supra note 7, at 1329.
162
Family Law Act Questions and Answers, supra note 126, at 3 (“Couples who have lived together in a
marriage-like relationship for two years are treated the same under the Family Law Act as married couples.”).
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moving in together, said, “we would rather not have had to wait the two
years” before the law considered them spouses. These partners were still
able to claim equal division based on unjust enrichment principles, but this
is a more challenging legal claim than relying on the “marriage-like”
relationship presumption that the law provides.163
2. The Non-sharers
Nevertheless, around half of the couples I interviewed expressed an
attitude that I interpret as rejecting equal division of assets and support
obligations upon separation. Interestingly, it was significantly easier to
characterize couples as rejecting the defaults, as they often expressed an
unequivocal attitude, and their behavior was strongly indicative of such an
approach. A few couples have purposefully created a distinct financial
separation: each partner had an independent bank account; they calculated
exactly how much each person contributed to the household; and each
partner generally had a sense that the other had their own separate financial
obligations. As Robert (thirty-five) noted, “It was clear from both of us that
we wanted to keep separate bank accounts and a lot of the finances separate.
So, we built a system based on that.”
Notably, the practice of separate financial regimes often correlated with
couples who expressed a sentiment that they are not confident in their
relationship’s future and are not ready to get married. Robert stated,
For me, at least the initial part of the relationship of moving
in, to keep separate accounts was more of a safeguard if things
didn’t work out between us. I had lived with a previous
partner, and obviously, things didn’t work out there . . . . So .
. . the thinking behind it was to kind of safeguard myself from
the worst-case scenario.
Caroline, his partner, expressed a similar sentiment: “Seeing a lot of
relationships, other peoples’ relationships breaking up and how difficult it
can be to sort of untangle it financially and not wanting to go through that,
that was probably the biggest reason, I guess.” When asked later why they
do not get married, they both indicated that they are not ready for this
commitment yet. Robert connected marriage with the separate financial regime:
I think that we’re probably not at the point in our lives where
we would want to make that change at the moment. I would
think that there would be a better time in the future for that . .
. . We’ve been living together for a bit but also looking at it we
haven’t lived together for that long and, you can’t get divorced
163
See Leckey, supra note 94, at 72, 74 (explaining that in certain jurisdictions, “unjust enrichment
offers former cohabitants their best recourse under the general private law,” and some jurisdictions have
extended “the presumption of equal division of family property” to “those cohabitants qualifying as
‘spousal’ or ‘marriage-like’”).
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if you don’t get married, so . . . if we were to break up, things
would be probably a little less messy than if we had to formally
file for divorce.
Similarly, Emily (twenty-nine) and Gareth (thirty), seasonal workers in
Whistler’s buzzing leisure and tourism industry, practice a strict financialseparation regime and also linked their nonmarriage to nonsharing.
According to Emily, being married would mean a stronger commitment,
including financial commitment. In her words, if they were to get married,
“I would tend more to make longer-term commitments . . . and more joint
commitments, and I think we would pool our finances more.” But,
meanwhile, as they are not there yet, the separate regime is beneficial to her
because “it’s nice to have that autonomy” [to do whatever she wants with
her money]. Matthew (thirty-three) mentioned to Jessica (twenty-eight) a
few occasions in which he had paid more than she had on some household
expenses, and stated, “For me, fair would mean you get what you brought, I
get what I brought. And that’s not 50/50, so to break it down 50/50, I feel
like that wouldn’t be fair.” And Jessica opined about equal sharing, “I think
that if he paid for it, or even though I paid a little bit, but he paid more, I
would think that he would take it ‘cause that was his, that’s your stuff.” This
couple, as well, showed hesitation toward commitment and indicated that
marriage would be the next level of commitment, but they were not ready to
take this step yet.
Two couples with low incomes were explicit about their reasons for
keeping money separate. In one case, the couple stayed unmarried purposely
to avoid sharing the debt of the male partner. Linda (thirty-two) and Bob
(thirty-six) have been best friends for years. When Linda bought a home
(because rent was too expensive), she invited Bob to join her as a platonic
roommate to help pay the mortgage. Later, their relationship started to
change because Linda wanted to have sexual relations with Bob; eventually,
they became a couple. Bob and Linda commingle their finances and share
their lives quite extensively. However, Linda does not want to get married,
mainly because she does not want to be responsible for Bob’s debt. Bob has
an eight-year-old child who lives in a different jurisdiction and an unstable
job. Linda stated that getting married will be “stressful” because Bob “has
debt, and I will have to take responsibility for that, and I don’t want to. So,
I will be resentful [of that if we get married].” When it comes to equal
sharing of properties, Linda also objects. She agrees that Bob deserves some
part of the appreciation of the property’s value, and she would not leave Bob
“high and dry.” However, she does not think that Bob should be entitled to
half of the property’s appreciation.
Although Molly and Lainey are not low-income, Lainey is also
concerned about liability for Molly’s debt. Molly is about to return to school,
and Lainey wants to avoid debt for her education expenses. She said they
might need to execute an agreement because “I don’t have debt, and she
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[Molly] does, and I guess that’s a risk for me.” Erin (the lawyer) expressed
a similar sentiment, as she does not think it is fair to share the increase in
property value and Williams’s student debt. Accordingly, she stated,
I was a little bit concerned because I find it a bit odd that
[obligation] backdates from the date of cohabitation when you
start, when you become common law, so basically, my place
increased in value pretty significantly in 2016, 2017, 2018 . . . .
And then he’s also got student debt, and so I don’t want to be
on the hook for that.
The other couple with a low income, Nicole (thirty-two) and James
(twenty-seven), have practical and ideological reasons to adopt a strict
separation regime. In Nicole’s words: “[Our finances are] so very, very
separate. He pays his own cell phone bill; I pay my own cell phone bill.”
One major incentive for their separation is that James is a recipient of
disability benefits as he is on the autism spectrum. Nicole commented,
The legal problem, I think once you start mixing that kind of
stuff personally, I think it’s harder to prove things legally . . .
it seems like a headache that I just don’t want to deal with so
that’s why, one reason that . . . we just have separate financial
situations, so it’s just not pertinent to mix, like he’s on
disability and I work, so I keep my paychecks, he keeps his
disability payments, and being in an abled/disabled
relationship, that’s pretty firmly separate . . . .
Besides their issue with losing social assistance, their reason is also
ideological. James defined himself as a “men’s rights activist,” and Nicole
is a feminist.164 While their ideologies are potentially conflicting,165 they share
the same conclusion when it comes to financial issues. James put forward that
being a men’s rights activist “really is what it sounds like, like all I want is for
both men and women to be equal under the law . . . .” Nicole elaborated on
James’s position while explaining how it corresponds with her views:
[H]e’s concerned with men being saddled with things like
alimony payments, he doesn’t think that it’s ethical that men
tend to end up with those legally quite often because they are
the higher earners, but, personally, I feel really similarly on the
opposite end of the spectrum. I don’t think anybody should be
164
See Rachel M. Schmitz and Emily Kazyak, Masculinities in Cyberspace: An Analysis of
Portrayals of Manhood in Men’s Rights Activist Websites, 5 SOC. SCI. 1, 1 (2016) (explaining that men’s
rights activists “seek to establish resources for men to utilize in maintaining their elevated position in
society in relation to women and other social minorities”).
165
See id. (detailing how men’s rights activism conflict with feminism, “men’s right activist groups
focus increasingly on the toxic consequences of feminism on men’s lives, leading to a distinctive antifeminist framework”).
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paying to take care of me, either, if that makes sense.
Alexandra (thirty-six), about to graduate from her PhD program in
science, is another individual who practices clear separation and adopts a
language of self-reliance. She mentioned, “I say I’m independent and I can
support myself right . . . . I wouldn’t expect because I have my job, I have
my career, I can support myself, I don’t expect anyone else to support me.”
In conclusion, for approximately half of the couples I interviewed, the
defaults of equal sharing reflect their presumed intention—at least, those
they are ready to admit to when their partner is sitting next to them, when
they are not in conflict, and when, for many of them, it is the first time they
have learned about the law. Considering this is the age group most likely to
create economic interdependencies, our findings call for more research into
the law’s effects on cohabitant groups who are less likely to merge finances
and become interdependent.
D. The Making of a Norm
I could have ended the analysis here and concluded that the law, at least
as applicable to couples in my sample, is not strongly majoritarian.
However, as these couples’ perceptions are hard to distinguish from the
law’s effects, my analysis would be superficial and incomplete if I failed to
consider how the law’s expressive and constitutive aspects shape couples’
expectations. Then, I explore the extent that the couples’ views about
sharing, as expressed in the interviews, are also shaped by the norm that the
defaults announce and whether the law also spreads a variation of traditional
marital norms. It comes as no surprise that the “[l]aw deflects society; but
society is reflected in the law.”166 This study suggests that an opt-out
approach sometimes infuses norms and sharpens legal entitlements and
expectations.
One main obstacle I encountered in ascertaining the expressive effect is
the large number of couples who are unaware of the law. There is an
interplay between one’s awareness of the law and its expressive function.
Unawareness of the law reduces its expressive operation.
Yet, when couples knew about the law—or some aspects of it—I found
sufficient indications that the law served as more than the reflection of their
perceived obligations; the law also conveyed norms. The interviews indicate
that the law propagates the norm of equal sharing through a few
mechanisms. To the extent they knew about the law, the participants
absorbed the norms that the law implies. Couples might think that if the law
adopts the norm that couples should share gains and losses after two years
of cohabitation, then it mirrors a typical pattern that is fair. This is
particularly true for couples who thought the regime was mandatory.
166

K. N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (1932).
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Interestingly, couples who thought there was no way to opt out typically had
a strong understanding of the law (they knew of the two years and realized
that it means an equal division of property and obligations to pay spousal
support in case of breakup). For them, we can assume a strong effect of the
law in communicating norms. Emma had a robust understanding of the law,
although she did not know that opting out is an option. Originally from
France, Nathan moved to Vancouver for work and met Emma; they now live
in BC and have a child together. He learned about the law from Emma. For
Nathan, coming from another country, the law at first sounded utterly
foreign. He stated,
I had no clue, and I listen to what [Emma] said . . . and I said,
okay, sure. I was also amazed about how you speed up in
Canada when you’re common law . . . and I was amazed by
that because [it is] very different from France’s system.
However, the law grew on him, and, especially after having a child, he
learned to accept this norm. He described his ambivalence and process of
coming to terms with the law as follows: “I was kind of worried at first, but
. . . like being in a relationship, it’s a risk and I had to accept the rules, and
that’s it.” Ethan, Kemala’s partner, also spoke of a process of resistance to
acceptance. Initially, when he learned about the law in 2013, he recollected,
I was single; I was initially kind of horrified; I was, like, what
the heck, what if two people don’t want to get married. I was
in the mindset of, wow, that’s like a huge risk to move in with
someone, so I was very initially against it. And then, yeah, it
kind of became exactly like [Kemala] said, this actually works
out, this is a big benefit as opposed to living in a country like
[where Kemala is originally from] which, you might not even
be able to sign a lease together.
Ethan’s tolerance for the law, it seems, developed due to his ability to
sponsor Kemala as a permanent resident after merely one year of living
together. Appreciating the recognition of their relationships by the federal
government influenced how he felt about other laws that govern unmarried
partners’ relationships.
Some couples also understand the two-year threshold as signifying that
the level of commitment ought to evolve—a sort of deadline that signals the
end of a deliberation period. After this, the couple’s inner status changes and
becomes closer to a traditional marriage model. Diter put this directly: “I
feel like it takes away a lot of the importance ‘cause you’re already forced
to commit, especially when you sign an agreement like I did.” The reality
for him is that the law “forced [him] to commit.” Similarly, for the engineers,
who knew the law reasonably well, the law had a symbolic effect on their
relationship. The male partner articulated that if the law labels them
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“spouses,” then the meaning is that the couple should behave accordingly.
He did not “expect anything to change when [they’re] actually married . . . .
[I]f you are married according to the law, that, to me is the commitment. So,
I think what the two years—I knew of the two years coming up,” and they
served as equivalent to being married.
Sometimes, the recognition of unmarried relationships channels maritallike behavior in more concrete and practical ways. In Antonio and Andrea’s
case, to apply for permanent residency as a couple, they opened a joint bank
account as a means “to prove that we’re a real relationship . . . it was a way
also to show that, yes, we are together.” The act of opening a joint bank
account accelerated the sharing regime that now regulates their relationship.
This is also the case for Ethan and Kemala, who opened up a bank account
(for which they had no use) to demonstrate the sincerity of their relationship
to the immigration agency. Initially, only Ethan deposited money into it.
Thus, he elaborated, “early last year we opened that and then we started
using it, and I started putting money in there and just paying bills out of that
account even though it was just my money.” This action opened the door to
more financial sharing, so the bank gave Kemala “a debit card, and then I
added her as an authorized user on my main credit card and we just, once a
month we go over the budget, we put in all our expenses.” Later on, Kemala
started to deposit her salary into this joint bank account.
The law’s constitutive aspect helps some partners justify, sometimes
even to defend, their legal entitlement or their “bargaining endowment.”167
The law equips each partner with the language to articulate an entitlement to
equal division or to justify and rationalize the law. Some interviews
indicated couples (or individual partners) had internalized the norms of the
law and are also familiar with the justifications for earlier legal protections
of the primary-caregiver spouse in case of a breakup. Some use these
concepts to defend this law. As Emma explained, “I personally think that is
a good thing, I think that it benefits women in potentially a situation that has
not benefited women in the past, so I kind of like it.” For Emma, then, the
opt-out reform is an evolution of previous laws that dealt with obligations
between married couples; and her understanding of the law derives from
preexisting versions of laws with similar functions.
Some couples, then, have adopted what Yvonne Zylan, a sociologist of
law, calls “justificatory narratives”—articulating terms that describe, in
legalese, social claims or entitlements, and justify state intervention based
on a “legitimacy-conferring” framework that was proffered by previous
claim-justifying discourses.168 These terms invite the law to intervene and
167
See Mark Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19
J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 7 (1981) (explaining that “[t]he bargaining endowment which courts bestow on
the parties includes not only the substantive entitlements conferred by legal rules, but also rules that
enable those entitlements to be vindicated”).
168
YVONNE ZYLAN, STATES OF PASSION: LAW, IDENTITY, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
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make “common-law partner” a legal category deserving of the state’s use of
ascription.169 In some of the partners’ minds, knowing about the law fortifies
the idea that they are entitled to a remedy. One cohabitant explained how the
law helps, or will help, in a case of a breakup, to assess their obligations:
“[W]e’re aware of the Act, we’re aware of the law . . . . [I]f we do end our
relationship . . . we [will] rely on the Act to guide us.” One interviewee
explained how knowing the law would have helped her to claim a benefit:
“And also if that system reminded you that, at this point, you are now
considered spouses, that would help people to realize that there are all these
benefits that you can now start using because you are spouses.” The law,
then, has a constitutive power in establishing expectations between partners
as well as between partners and third parties.
Studies about the impact of default rules on the status quo provide
another vehicle to understand the extent to which the law broadcasts norms
of sharing and commitment. Studies on status quo bias abound. These sets
of behavioral-economy experiments test the hypothesis that, all things being
equal, people prefer to maintain their status quo rather than to modify their
situation.170 Research finds ample evidence for the bias (in favor of status
quo) and, in particular, regarding default rules. Russell Korobkin famously
argues that “when lawmakers anoint a contract term the default, the
substantive preferences of contracting parties shift—that term becomes
more desirable, and other competing terms becoming less desirable.”171 For
the few couples that knew about and understood the legal regime, the law
seems to have this effect: if they get to talk about their commitments and
obligations, the law serves as a legitimizing source, reflecting that their
sharing regime is in line with the norm. Logan, who entered into a
cohabitation agreement with Olivia, explained the legitimizing effect of the
default rules: “there wasn’t anything in [the contract] that I was super against
because of the fact that it follows the current Act pretty well, so . . . .” Here
is an example, then, of how couples negotiate cohabitation agreements in the
shadow of the law.
Overall, the default barely “reflects what most people would choose if
they were adequately informed.”172 In any event, this rule is sometimes “too
crude” in that it brings together heterogeneous groups of sharing and
commitment practices.173 The law diffuses particular cultural understandings
of obligations, which might be unexpected for people from non-Canadian
DESIRE 58–59 (2011).
169
See Ménard, supra note 135, at 62 (defining common-law partners as “partners who live together
in a conjugal relationship”).
170
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608,
611–12 (1998).
171
Id. at 611.
172
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF CHOICE
73 (2015) (emphasis omitted).
173
Id. at 77.
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legal cultures, such as immigrants. And when known to the couples, the law
plays a role in establishing and justifying legal entitlement for equal sharing
and spousal support.
IV. FUNCTION, PRIVATIZATION, AND MENUS
Drawing on the analysis of the opt-out regime in Part III, this Part zooms
out to examine what insights the couples’ experiences can provide regarding
the scholarly and policy debate in the United States. As the following
discussion suggests, both supporters and critics of the opt-out regime missed
the mark on the consequences of the approach. Section A argues that
functionalists fail to appreciate that the regime creates semi-statuses, with
inadequate regard to the couple’s actual familial function. Section B
contends that traditionalists dramatize an opt-out scheme’s effects on
marriage and the family law system altogether. Finally, both sides
underappreciate how the opt-out model promotes privatization of dependency.
A. A Menu of Marriages
Literature supporting an opt-out regime labels it as “functional”—
meaning, a legal scheme that does not determine legal consequences of
relationships based on formalities (such as a written agreement, registration,
or marriage certificate) but rather on the family’s function.174 As Nancy
Polikoff, in endorsing the ALI Principles, submits, an opt-out scheme advances
“inclusion within the law of all relationships that achieve the law’s purpose.”175
The main flaw in labeling an opt-out system as advancing functional
qualities is that, in practice, the scheme establishes what scholars have
traditionally referred to as “statuses.”176 Although the definition of “status”
is complex and a subject of some disagreement, for the purpose of this
Article it is sufficient to use its basic definitions to illustrate that an opt-out
regime creates a legal situation akin to status.177 Black’s Law Dictionary has
two definitions of status that are relevant here. One, “[a] person’s legal
condition regarding personal rights but excluding proprietary relations <the

174
For a definition of functionalism, see Edward Stein, Looking Beyond Full Relationship
Recognition for Couples Regardless of Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or Functionalism, 28 L. & INEQ.
345, 365 (2010) (“Under this approach, the characteristics of a relationship—rather than, or in addition
to, its formal legal status—determine how a relationship should be treated under the law.”).
175
Polikoff, supra note 28, at 366.
176
For a discussion of the meaning of “status” as concerning marriage, see Hanoch Dagan &
Elizabeth S. Scott, Reinterpreting the Status-Contract Divide: The Case of Fiduciaries, in CONT,
STATUS, & FIDUCIARY L. 51, (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016); Libby Adler, Inconceivable:
Status, Contract, and the Search for a Legal Basis for Gay & Lesbian Parenthood, 123 PENN ST. L. REV.
1, 25–26 (2018).
177
As mentioned previously, supra note 37, I prefer to treat marriage as its effects. The discussion
of “status” here is solely a response to the argument that an opt-out regime shifts the law from status to
function.
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status of a father> <the status of a wife>.”178 Two, “[a] person’s legal
condition insofar as it is imposed by the law without the person’s consent,
as opposed to a condition that the person has acquired by agreement <the
status of a slave>.”179
Under these two definitions, to a great extent, the opt-out regime in BC
acts like it establishes a status rather than screening for function. Unless they
contract out, most couples find themselves in a “legal condition regarding
personal rights,” sometimes even “imposed by the law without the person’s
consent.”180 As I argue in Section III.A.2., the contractual approach fails to
provide an effective way to opt out. The system’s reliance on contractual
instruments means that most couples subscribe to (or find themselves
abiding by) the default rules, in lieu of an affirmative undertaking or, in some
cases, even without tacit consent. In the absence of a more user-friendly
mechanism to opt out, the notion that unmarried couples can choose not to
live in an “ascribed marriage” is a fiction. The opt-out approach, then,
imposes a “status” on most individuals. Indeed, Grace Ganz Blumberg, one
of the ALI Principles’ reporters, described its approach as “status-based.”181
Theoretically, the opt-out model is functional because it applies only to
couples who meet the criteria of living in “marriage-like” relationships.
Thus, the argument goes, unmarried couples can avoid the ascription ex-ante
by not living in marriage-like relationships and ex-post by proving that their
relationships did not resemble marriage and they do not qualify as
spouses.182 However, there are multiple problems in relying on the standardmade formulation of “marriage-like” to cultivate the scheme’s functionality
and avoid misclassifications. First, “marriage-like” is a vague standard that
leaves plenty of room for judicial discretion.183 Just as marriage today has
many forms, “marriage-like” encompasses various configurations. As one
Saskatchewan trial court put it:
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Status, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Id.
180
Id.
181
Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and
Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1273 (2001) (“Other
jurisdictions and authorities have taken the path of status rather than contract . . . .”). Other commentators
frequently treat the opt-out approach as status-based. See, e.g., Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders:
What the American Law Institute Has Done for Gay and Lesbian Families, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 87, 101 (2001) (“In contrast, the Principles choose to adopt an explicitly equitable, statusbased approach . . . .”).
182
See, e.g., Leckey, supra note 94, at 140–41 (explaining how individuals must show that they
have “cohabited ‘as spouses’ or ‘in a marriage-like relationship’”).
183
See id. (explaining that the definition of spouse is “qualitative” and that individuals “must have
cohabited . . . ‘in a marriage-like relationship.’” Also explaining how there are “disputes regarding the
nature and duration” of cohabitations and the “need to prove the nature and duration of the relationship
complicates assumptions that reform will ease the evidentiary burden linked, pre-reform, with claims in
unjust enrichment”).
179
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Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal
relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their
relationships differently. . . . Because of the variety of relationships, no
one factor can be determinative of the issue of whether a spousal
relationship actually exists. All relevant factors must be weighed to
reach such a determination . . . .184
Due to the flexibility of the standard, few couples without written
contract can predict that their relationships will not meet the test of
“marriage-like.” Despite the critique that courts have considered primarily
traditional relationships as married-like, courts have also been willing to
consider as “marriage-like” relationships in which the couples kept a
financial separation regime or do not live together any longer.185 While these
outcomes, in my view, have been justified in the specific cases, they point
to the indeterminacy of this regime, as well as to the reasonable chance that
a couple will satisfy the standard of living in a marriage-like relationship.
Second, in any event, in case of dispute, the burden of litigating is heavy and
costly. A partner might prefer to reach a settlement rather than going to trial
to prove their relationship was not “marriage-like.” Third, as I discussed
previously, the law promotes the norms of conjugality by formalizing the
notion that partners are entitled to an equal division of property and spousal
support upon separation. Therefore, the chances of being in a non-marriage-like
relationship are even smaller, as partners might absorb the law’s precept that
equal division and spousal support obligations are the expected norm and find
that they are entitled to such an arrangement. From the standpoint of Holmes’s
bad man,186 we might even speculate that one partner could take advantage of
the background rules that create an expectation of compensation.187
In summation, the result of the regime’s contractualization, with the
elusive definition of “marriage-like,” undermines the argument that an optout scheme classifies relationships based on their function. Effectively, an
opt-out system brings in marriage through the back door, creating a world
where most couples who live together for more than two years are
considered spouses for property division and spousal support purposes.
Supporters of an opt-out regime also justify it as protective of women.
As Bowman puts forward when advocating an opt-out approach in the
United States, “[i]ndividuals in such [unmarried] families, especially women
and children, are likely to be left in a vulnerable economic position if the
184

Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124, para. 10, 15 (Can.).
Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492, para. 21, 27 (holding that economic dependence or
interdependence is only one factor in determining “marriage-like,” and relationships that are not
economically dependent can be recognized as “marriage-like”).
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459.
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See Janet Halley, Conclusion: Distribution and Decision: Assessing Governance Feminism, in
GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: AN INTRODUCTION 253–54 (2018) (suggesting how to do “distributional
analysis” and detailing how one element is “separating is from ought”) (citation omitted).
185

2021]

COMPULSORY CONJUGALITY

105

union is ended by separation or death.”188 There is no question that because
women typically contribute more unpaid labor to the household and are often
the primary care providers for children, they are more likely to be harmed
by a breakup.189 Without rules of equal division of property and spousal
support obligations, the primary care provider might be left without
properties that the family, as a joint venture, created and grew in value. There
is no doubt that the opt-out approach assists some women, especially those
in relationships with traditional gender roles, in receiving their fair share in
the household family property.
Nonetheless, the question arises as to whether, and to what extent, an
opt-out approach supports all women. This is because the risk of
misclassification might be harmful to some women, particularly to women
with low incomes and low wealth. In recent years, sociology and
demography scholarship has documented that women in the United States
do not get married because they are concerned that their male partners are
financially unstable, and these women are not willing to assume
responsibility for the debt (or future debt) of their partners.190 For instance,
in a recent study of never-married individuals, 78% of female participants
indicated that finding a partner with a steady job is very important to them.191
Indeed, recall that it was the reason Linda (one of the interviewees) did not
marry Bob.192 Unfortunately for Linda, the FLA equally divides debt
incurred during relationships. While Bob had incurred some of his debt
before his relationship with Linda, Bob incurred other debt while they were
living together. Although Linda did not marry Bob precisely because she
wished to avoid sharing his debt, they lived in a marriage-like relationship
(per their statement in the interview and based on my analysis of their
relationship, as described). For Linda and women with low income and low
wealth , the opt-out system might be detrimental.
Simultaneously, the opt-out approach might be—or is even likely to
188
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 2 (2007).
189
Women still perform more housework and carework than their male counterparts. Despite major
changes in women’s participation in the paid labor force, it is still the reality that, especially in households
with children, specialization of carework is prevalent. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
in 2011, 64.2% of mothers with children under six years participated in the labor force, compared with
76.5% of mothers with children six to seventeen years of age. Twenty-seven percent of employed women
usually worked part time, while only 11% of men did. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., WOMEN IN THE
LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK (2013) (providing statistics for women in the labor force); Cynthia Lee
Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-Parenting Commitments, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 207 (2012) (“The primary family responsibilities that lead married mothers to limit
paid employment go far in explaining the motherhood penalty.”).
190
See e.g., Carbone & Cahn, supra note 8, at 100 (“Women see themselves as assuming primary
responsibility for children, and if a man is not pulling his own weight in the relationship, he may detract
from the woman’s ability to provide for herself and the children.”).
191
Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married, PEW RES. CTR.
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewsocial-trends.org/2014/09/24/record-share-of-americans-have-never-married/.
192
See supra Section III.C.
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be—disadvantageous to women who execute an agreement concerning
financial obligations. When BC promulgated the law, it also modified the
rules concerning courts’ review of contracts. The FLA adopted a less
interventionist approach than its predecessor, lessening the court’s authority
to set aside domestic contracts.193 While before the reform, the court was
able to set aside a contract upon finding unfairness, the new threshold for
intervention is “significant unfairness.”194 The result is that women who
enter into an agreement that gives them only a few rights in the property will
have slimmer chances of successfully challenging that agreement. The
scheme thus strengthens predictability while diminishing judges’ discretion
and making the excuse of obligation more difficult. Because those who
execute contracts are likely those with significant properties, wealthy
women will be worse off in this regime than before. This is especially true
because parties bargain in the shadow of the default rules, so it is unlikely
that they will get much more than the default rules grant them; put
differently, those rules more or less set the framework for what each partner
expects to get.195
Moreover, importantly, the default rules are not optimal for the
economically weaker partner.196 The strengthening of contract enforceability
in an opt-out regime is not unique to BC. The basic principle of a regime
that imposes default rules that establish obligations between the partners is
to enable parties to opt out with a degree of certainty. We can reasonably
predict that every state that adopts an opt-out regime will accompany it with
rules that reduce courts’ authority to review contracts that met procedural
requirements.197
Further, not only does the opt-out regime fail to promote functional
family law or assist women of all economic classes, it also stands in
contradiction to a well-developed menu of regulatory regimes for legal
recognition of relationships.198 The idea of such a menu of options means
commitment to the “recognition of a variety of supportive family forms
offering persons of all sexes and orientations the opportunity to structure
193
See, e.g., Asselin v. Roy, [2013] BCSC 1681, para. 124 (Can.) (“The tenor of the
new Act appears to favour a less interventionist approach than its predecessor, the FRA.”).
194
Id. at para. 128 (“Under the previous legislation, a finding of unfairness based on one of
enumerated factors in s. 65(1) was sufficient to allow the court to, in effect, rewrite the parties’
Agreement to achieve the fairness found lacking in the original version.”).
195
See Galanter, supra note 167, at 27–28 (discussing the presence of customary laws, lurking in
the “shadows,” throughout history). Of course, the bargaining endowments do not exclude the option that
the prenuptial agreement will grant more than the default. Still, at least the default rules stand as a general
guideline for what the parties can reasonably expect.
196
See Aloni, supra note 56, at 353–54 (providing an example of how default rules disadvantage
the economically weaker partner).
197
Cf., id. at 349–53 (discussing the connection between procedural and substantive requirements
in domestic agreements).
198
See Stein, supra note 174, at 360 (defining such a menu as “the development of a plurality of
relationship-recognition alternatives that includes, but is not limited to, marriage”).
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their families and live their lives as best suits them.”199 This menu of
regulatory options refers to establishing various legal mechanisms, beyond
marriage, to enable couples to organize the consequences of their mutual
lives. For example, a menu can include an additional registration scheme
(like a civil union or domestic partnership) that helps couples who do not
wish to get married to organize their mutual obligations. Such a system
responds to the needs of diverse types of families, composed of different
commitment levels and varied legal needs.
The menu of options in BC does not come close to this description. The
system nudges couples into one of three options: be single, live in a nonsolemnized marriage, or live in a solemnized marriage. A fourth option—
shaping one’s unique preferences—is dependent on contracts and thus
becomes costly and difficult to accomplish. The result is a menu composed
of marriage in different forms, and only a little more flexibility for
individuals and couples who can use contracts to achieve it.
This limited menu is not an issue that is unique to BC; rather, every optout model that is so ascriptive will adversely affect the other institutions on
the menu and will de facto prevent a meaningful menu from developing.
This is because one of the basic principles of a well-functioning menu is that
it should not offer options that neutralize other options in a way that, de
facto, decreases choice. In other words, for a menu of options to be
successful, the options should correlate with each other. The options need to
be tangential: they can touch the boundaries of each other but not take over
one another.200 In a system with an opt-out option, because all rights and
benefits are already granted to unmarried couples, they have little reason to
enter into a different legal institution or to negotiate the legal effects of their
relationships. This makes the addition of any potential registration scheme
useless. If couples have no motivation to register, any other institution on
the menu will be unserviceable (couples will not use it because it does not
offer an extra value).201
BC’s menu of options—if we can even use this term in the case of BC—
is better called a “menu of marriages.” The words of Halley, describing the
considerably less ascriptive system in the United States, fit well here: this
system is “less emphatic about choice, more regulatory, more governmental
in the Foucaultian sense than a real menu of options.”202
199

Case, supra note 42, at 1772.
For more on the “menu of options” for legal recognition of relationships, see Aloni, supra note
43, at 599.
201
The worldwide experience with civil unions and domestic partnerships teaches that when the
institutions on the menu do not offer an extra value mimic other institutions, couples are unlikely to select
them. That experience clearly demonstrates that civil unions are only a burden on family law, and couples
rarely choose them as an alternative to other forms of regulatory choices. “With the exception of France
and Belgium . . . registered partnerships generally are not a popular option among opposite-sex couples.
Nor are they very popular among same-sex couples.” Id. at 600.
202
Halley, supra note 37, at 32 (emphasis in original).
200
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B. The End or the Revival of Marriage
For precisely these reasons, traditionalist scholarship’s strong resistance
to an opt-out model is puzzling. Critics of the ALI Principles argue that an
opt-out regime will undermine marriage. Lynn Wardle’s critique is typical;
accordingly, the ALI Principles “significantly weaken the institution of
marriage.”203 Wardle states that having marriage alternatives will encourage
individuals to choose “the dangerous alternative of nonmarital domestic
partnership if it is legalized.”204 Other appraisals add that preferring marriage
to institutionalized cohabitation is imperative because “evidence strongly
suggests that the marital advantage is real and that it persists across national,
cultural, and socioeconomic boundaries.”205 Traditionalist scholarship
further contends that “conscriptive schemes conflict with social policies
favoring formal marriage and marital childbearing by suggesting that public
support for marriage is declining.”206
But an opt-out regime, to the extent that couples actually know about it
(which is doubtful), can send an even stronger message of support for
marriage and the norms attendant to the institution. In view of that, it does
not matter whether one formally marries or not; after two years, couples
should adopt marital norms. In practice, the opt-out approach does not
undermine marriage; it endorses marital commitment to its largest extent.
The opt-out regime, which deems most people as married regardless of
whether they are registered or not, brings marriage through the back door,
contributing to the rearticulation of the traditional family as the site of
caregiving and support. Indeed, it brings marriage back to its glory days, in
which most people were married. In an opt-out regime, marriage is so
important that it serves as the default framework for most intimate
relationships.
The interviews confirm that BC’s opt-out approach did not undermine
marriage in the sense of traditionalists’ concern. Generally speaking, at least
half of the interviewees mentioned that they plan on getting married at some
future point. For some, although they were legally recognized as spouses,
marriage still serves as an additional step in signaling commitment.
Courtney and Richard are an excellent example. Both identify as
polyamorous, Courtney is once divorced, and Richard has a child from a
previous partner. Richard is an ideological cohabitant who does not believe
in marriage. Yet, Courtney explains that marriage is still important to her for
practical and symbolic matters. Practically, she said:
203

Wardle, supra note 90, at 1226–27.
Id.
205
Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 309, 328 (2008). For a similar argument, see, for example, Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic
Partnership: Missing the Target?, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 19, 23–24 (2002) (arguing that “cohabitation
does not promote ‘economic efficiency’ in the same way marriage does”).
206
Garrison, supra note 205, at 330.
204
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[M]arriage is a really easy way to make sure all of your bases
are covered in like the event of an emergency. . . . You don’t
need a piece of paper that says that you love each other, you
need the piece of paper that says automatically without filing
30 different other pieces of paper that really you’re never
going to get around to filing that makes sure that that person
has the rights that they need in an emergency.
On the symbolic level, marriage still holds a particular significance in
society. Thus, common-law status, according to Courtney,
doesn’t have the more automatic sort of respect. One of
[Richard’s] family members had a Christmas dinner, and
boyfriends and girlfriends weren’t invited. Had we been
actually married, there’s no way in hell they would have not
invited me. But because we’re not actually married in their
eyes, I’m just his girlfriend.
Couples in which both partners did not wish to get married had various
reasons, all in line with the general reasons that people cohabit. Some were
waiting for more financial stability before they take this step. For others,
marriage meant a ceremony that is costly (although they can register with
the province with minimal cost) and thus unnecessary. Others opposed
marriage from an ideological standpoint. Yet, these couples who expressed
no desire to get married for the reasons I listed typically manifested
commitment levels no different from those who wished to get married.
Overall, the law did not have the effect of steering these couples away from
marriage. Those who do not wish to get married, although living in
committed long-term relationships, were not motivated by the law not to do
so, at least not consciously.
Traditionalists are further apprehensive that marriage alternatives create
confusion that further undermines marriage.207 The interviews show that this
critique is justified: couples have a hard time learning about the rules that
govern their relationships. However, many studies have shown that couples
are confused even in the absence of an opt-out regime. In the end, the
complexities of family composition will require the move to a more complex
family law. There are ways to ameliorate the harms of confusions—and I
suggest some of them in the Conclusion. But confusion cannot serve as a
justification that outweighs all other considerations.
C. Cohabitation as Privatization
In recent years, privatization of dependency emerged as a major critique
207
Wax, supra note 90, at 1012 (“The alternatives to marriage create a plethora of choices and
uncertainties. The understandings, roles, and duties that attend the myriad liaisons short of marriage are
murky, confused, conflicting, and poorly defined.”).
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of the role of marriage and of family law institutions more generally.
Scholars have pointed out that privatization of support is one of the
keystones of family law in the United States.208 A primary function of family
law is to free the state from the burden of supporting dependent members of
society. The state “recognizes and bestows benefits on families so that they
will serve a private welfare function, minimizing reliance on state and
federal coffers.”209 Although the private welfare function is rarely discussed
as an impetus for an opt-out regime, this objective is discernable in adopting
such a regime.
Family law history in the United States is filled with steady sequences
that enforce and expand private support obligations among intimate partners.
For example, in the nineteenth century, common-law marriage served as a
doctrine that “provided judges with a way to privatize the financial
dependency of economically unstable women plaintiffs.”210 Fast forward to
the twenty-first century, courts justifying the legalization of same-sex
marriage in the United States also recognized the role of privatization as a
function of marriage.211 As one New Jersey judge put it, “[m]arriage’s vital
purpose is not to mandate procreation but to control or ameliorate its
consequences—the so-called ‘private welfare’ purpose.”212
From this perspective, just as in the United States, where the commonlaw marriage doctrine has served to deepen the privatization of dependency,
the Canadian context teaches the same. A famous Canadian Supreme Court
case challenged the exclusion of unmarried couples from matrimonial
protections as unconstitutional.213 Supreme Court Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
dissented, contending that treating unmarried couples differently than
married couples, in this case, is discriminatory.214 In her fierce dissent, she
acknowledged that rules of equal division serve a “desire to avoid diverting
funds from the public purse in order to support separated individuals.”215
Proponents of an opt-out regime should be careful with what they wish
for. There is no question that the opt-out mechanism advances the

208
See Margaret Ryznar, The Odd Couple: The Estate Tax and Family Law, 76 LA. L. REV. 523,
540 (2015) (“The traditional view of families is as economic support for its members. In fact, society
depends on the family as a private safety net, and family law is a leading example of this societal
dependency.”).
209
Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 1866–
67 (2014).
210
Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
957, 969 (2000).
211
Rosenbury, supra note 209, at 1868 (“In Windsor, the Court also acknowledged the role of
family members in providing support to one another, thereby privatizing dependency.”); Douglas
NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 230 (2013).
212
Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
213
Nova Scotia (Att’y Gen’l) v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.R. 83 (Can.)
214
Id.
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Id. at para. 116.
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privatization of dependency, which is a prime goal of fiscal conservatives.216
The opt-out regime might just be another step in a system that already relies
on the families to fill in the role that the government should be taking.
Privatizing support is part of a larger neoliberal approach that seeks to
transfer economic risks from the collective to families themselves.217 In
neoliberal thought, marriage serves to “impose discipline and privatize
dependency among the poor.”218 Marriage “is a gendered institution for
privatizing social costs—women, dependent on husbands or the low-wage
job market, must bear responsibility for child care costs.”219 The ideology
that the married family is at the center of society, and is the primary unit for
support in time of economic crises, sends a signal that it is the spouses’ role
to take care of one another.
The implications of an opt-out regime—besides the obvious care for the
economically vulnerable partner—is the continuance of an ideology that
relies on individuals to care for basic needs. Privatization results in increased
inequality in life chances between those who can afford to raise a family and
those who cannot.220 Further, in the United States, where a large percentage
of cohabiting couples have low income and wealth, the privatization aspect
is even more noticeable and impactful. The state has long tried to deal with
poverty by increasing marriage rates.221 Moving to increase marriage rates
via recognition of marriage-like relationships might just be another
incarnation of marriage promotion policy. Moreover, low-income couples
who rely on state-welfare support would lose some income-based subsidies
because of such recognition.
In summary, in the absence of measures to assist couples in making an
active choice and considering the stickiness of default rules and of couples’
cognitive biases against arranging their obligations, the channeling function
of the rule-based approach promotes privatization and commitment. The law
assumes couples are altruistic: they share everything.222 Contracting out of
216
Brenda Cossman observes that in the U.S., there are three (sometimes conflicting) influential
conservative values: fiscal conservatism, libertarianism, and social conservatism. In general, Cossman
demonstrates that in family law, the tendency is to shift the state’s cost of support to the private sphere—
to the partners (fiscal conservatism). Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the
Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 461–65 (2005).
217
Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1558 (2006).
218
LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY? NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND THE
ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 64 (2003).
219
Id.
220
See generally Allison Anna Tait, The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, ALA. L.
REV. 982 (2019) (arguing that family law exceptional dealing with high wealth families entrench wealth
inequality).
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See Isabel V. Sawhill & Ron Haskins, Work and Marriage: The Way to End Poverty and
Welfare, BROOKINGS (Sept. 1, 2003), https://www.brookings.edu/research/work-and-marriage-the-wayto-end-poverty-and-welfare/ (noting that certain laws, for example, the welfare law of 1996, encouraged
marriage with the goal of lowering the poverty rate).
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On the role of mandatory altruism in family law and between spouses, see generally, Janet
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altruism is difficult. Additionally, the law’s choices are quite limited. The
law nudges couples into one of four options: be single, be married by default,
or be married with formalities. The fourth option—shaping one’s unique
preferences—becomes costly and difficult to accomplish.
CONCLUSION
It has become a cliché to state that family structure has changed, and the
law has not kept pace. But it is clear that, with the rise in the number of
informal relationships, the status quo cannot remain for long. When
choosing how to address the regulatory design, opt-out regimes can and
should remain on the table as one strategy. Nonetheless, BC teaches a critical
lesson about the common complications that are involved in implementing
such a regime. Below, I offer what potential pitfalls to avoid and some
strategies on how to do so. I do not aim to present an exhaustive list and
analysis, simply to point to main topics, with some initial thoughts on
refraining from repeating BC’s mistakes.
A primary problem with an opt-out regime is that people do not know
about the law. This is not a drawback unique to this area: transparency and
publicity of default legal regimes can make the difference between enabling
choice and mandating one.223 A few simple steps can make the law more
transparent and known, and thus more effective and just. For instance, one
interviewee suggested that lease agreements (the templates themselves)
should contain some disclosure about the law. It makes sense because, while
some partners move into the other partner’s or partners’ home, a substantial
percentage of couples move together into a new apartment. This is a
worthwhile way, with minimal regulatory costs, to make couples aware of
the defaults that are likely to govern their relationship. Notifying a couple
when they have reached their two-year mark, to the extent the government
knows about it (for example, because the couple file taxes together), would
likewise not require too great an administrative burden.
Of course, the more the default law is known, the stronger its
constitutive effect will be. Thus, couples’ knowledge alone would be an
advance, but their knowledge alone is insufficient. Hence, considering the
impact that the law governing informal relationships has, a less ascriptive
mechanism might include (at least) an easier way to opt out. I can imagine
various ways to channel couples to deliberate and make an informed choice
about their mutual financial obligations. As one example, individuals in BC
who want to notify the relevant parties where their latest will is simply fill
in an online form and pay $17 to register their will.224 An equivalent
Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUM. 1, 3–4 (2011).
223
Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 172, at 86 (arguing that default rules should be transparent to gain
legitimacy).
224
Wills Registry, BRITISH COLUMBIA, https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/life-events/death/willsregistry (last visited Aug. 5, 2020).
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mechanism that enables couples to alter the defaults that govern their
relationships does not exist.
The heterogeneity of experiences the couples in this study exhibited,
along with other studies confirming cohabitation as a diverse practice, lead
to the understanding that one-size-fits-all is not going to work in this area.
Hence, one option is to formulate customized default rules that function
differently according to typical common grounds among types of
partnerships. Just as default rules for investing retirement funds change
according to age (younger age: riskier track; older: more solid), the law can
tailor defaults based on the partnership type. As an example: for the elderly,
no automatic equal division, and just the opposite for people in long-term
first relationships. Such a regime can make the law more complicated;
however, relationships are complex, and one default will rarely fit all.
Another possibility, as I suggest elsewhere, is creating a registration scheme
that is functional enough to accommodate the needs of various types of
relationships (not merely marriage-by-a-different-name).225 A registration
scheme would be flexible and would also enable conjugal and nonconjugal
partners to designate their partner as a beneficiary for various
circumstances.226 Yet, under BC’s opt-out model, where marital benefits and
duties are automatically assigned, few couples would have an incentive to
use such registration.
The bottom line is that more innovative and systematic thinking is
required. An effective plan cannot isolate one part of the menu of options
but will look at the entire system together. Reform must envision a
comprehensive plan and policy recommendations for a set of legal
institutions—a menu of options for legal recognition of relationships—that
work in harmony, increase choice, and reflect the reality of family life in the
twenty-first century. Fragmentation, such as focusing only on the rules of
contracts between unmarried couples, without thinking about the default
rules of division of properties and support, is doomed to fail. This is because
the other institutions of family law also affect the lives of unmarried couples.
Thus, construing rules of recognition without contemplating which rules of
division should apply, or what rules for contract formation and opting out
are enforceable, will soon face problems.
While it is not what the law’s promoters had hoped for, the good news
is that the outcomes have been, for the most part, less dramatic than both
sides of the debate imagined. Of course, since this study was limited to
young adults, mainly educated and often childless, to better assess the
regime, we ought to learn the effects the law has on other groups of
cohabitants. Both supporters and critics should contend with how the law
225
See Aloni, supra note 43, at 607–31 (proposing a “registered contractual relationships” scheme
founded on contracts and providing for maximum flexibility).
226
See generally Eskridge Jr., supra note 5, at 1965 (discussing the possible configuration of menus
and their utility for nonconjugal partners).
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has spread conjugality, bringing in traditionalism through the back door.
Indeed, on the whole, it is a regime of compulsory conjugality—as most
partners will find themselves married by default. For some, that will be good
news; for others, proof of the extent to which marriage is the core institution
in whose likeness other institutions are created. The opt-out regime also
promotes privatization of dependency, an already well-entrenched function
of family law and policy. Some might find this positive, but progressives
who support an opt-out regime must engage with the fact that it is a major
impetus and a significant result of the scheme.
In any event, BC’s experiment with an opt-out regime, even if not the
success that many wished, helps scholars and policymakers to better
understand how to shape a law responsive to the reality of diverse family
structures. It will assist in crafting the next type of regulatory regime. It is
better than stagnation. Now it is the job of family law commentators,
policymakers, and legislators to take this to the next stage.
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APPENDIX A: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERVIEWEES
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Ages
21 and 21
27 and 26
32 and 31
28 and 29
43 and 48
36 and 35
27 and 29
37 and 40
30 and 42
29 and 30
23 and 25
29 and 33
31 and 31
28 and 33
32 and 35
28 and 30
30 and 29
30 and 31
32 and 38
32 and 27
36 and 43
27 and 28
28 and 27
29 and 28
33 and 35
26 and 29
30 and 31
30 and 29
33 and 44

Occupations
Works at a non-profit/Software
developer
Bike
workshop coordinator/Carpenter
Chemistry instructor/Unemployed
Graduate student/Hotel manager
Midwife/Accountant
Legal assistant/Software engineer
Dietician/Computer engineer
Software sales rep/Chiropractor
Unemployed/Entrepreneur
Small-business owners (both)
Urban farmer/Recent graduate
Engineer/Engineer
Mortgage broker/General manager
Marketing/Technician
Student/Service manager
High school teacher/Social worker
assistantcoordinator/e-Commerce
Events
Counsellor/Medical writer
Electrician/Sprinkler fitter
Art teacher/Disability
PhD student/Communications
Visual artist/Applications support
engineer
Property manager/Project coordinator
Lawyer/Teacher
Occupational therapist/Labour contract
negotiator
Banker/Executive
Brewery worker/Landscaper
Actor/Writer
Social Worker/Data manager

Ethnicity (self-described)
Canadian/White
Caucasian/Canadian
Jewish/Not
stated
Scottish/White Italian
Brazilian/Not stated
White/White
Canadian White/Western
European
Indian Fijian/Indian Fijian
French Canadian/Canadian
White/White
English Canadian/Caucasian
Australian
Caucasian/Caucasian
White/Canadian
White/White
Canadian/Canadian
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/Caucasian
White/Caucasian
Javanese Muslim/Jewish
Canadian
White/White
White Canadian/White
Canadian
White/Serbian
White/White
White/Métis
Jewish/Jewish
White/White
Chinese/German
Canadian/Canadian
White/White
White Australian/White
European

